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This paper solves several fundamental open problems about statistical
zero-knowledge interactive proofs (SZKIPs). The following two theorems are
proven:
v If language L has a statistical zero-knowledge interactive proof
against an honest verifier, then L has a statistical zero-knowledge ‘‘public-
coin’’ interactive proof against an honest verifier. (Theorem 1)
v If L has a statistical zero-knowledge public-coin interactive proof
against an honest verifier then ‘‘the complement of L’’ has a statistical zero-
knowledge constant (one) round interactive proof against an honest verifier.
(Theorem 2)
The following corollaries are obtained directly from these two theorems and
the recent result by Goldreich, Sahai, and Vadhan (1998, ‘‘Proc. of STOC,’’
pp. 409418).
v [Public-coin SZKIP=Private-coin SZKIP].[Honest verifier SZKIP
=Any verifier SZKIP]. If L has a statistical zero-knowledge interactive
proof against an ‘‘honest verifier,’’ then L has a statistical zero-knowledge
public-coin interactive proof against ‘‘any verifier.’’
v [SZKIP=co-SZKIP]. If L has a statistical zero-knowledge interac-
tive proof, then the ‘‘complement’’ of L has a statistical zero-knowledge
(public-coin) interactive proof.
v [Bounded round SZKIP=Unbounded round SZKIP]. If L has a
statistical zero-knowledge interactive proof, then L has a statistical zero-
knowledge ‘‘constant (one) round’’ interactive proof against an honest
verifier.
v [Black-box simulation SZKIP=Auxiliary-input SZKIP]. If L has a
statistical ‘‘auxiliary-input’’ zero-knowledge interactive proof, then L has a
statistical ‘‘black-box simulation’’ zero-knowledge interactive proof.  2000
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Problems
The notion of zero-knowledge interactive proofs was proposed in 1985 by
Goldwasser et al. [GMR89], who introduced two remarkable notions: interactive
proof and zero-knowledge.2
An interactive proof system is a natural generalization of class NP, where interac-
tion (between a prover and a verifier) and randomization (i.e., coin flips of the
verifier) are employed in an interactive proof system, while only one-way interac-
tion (or noninteraction) and deterministic computation are allowed in a proof
system corresponding to class NP. In the interactive proof system, the prover
probabilistically convinces the verifier that the input is in the language through an
interactive conversation between the prover and the verifier. Here, the prover has
some advantage over the verifier such as much stronger computing power or extra
information. The class of languages recognized through interactive proof systems,
IP, was shown to be equivalent to PSPACE by [Sha92, LFKN90].
Informally, an interactive proof system is called zero-knowledge if whatever the
verifier could generate in probabilistic polynomial-time after seeing his view of an
interactive proof, he could also generate in probabilistic polynomial-time upon
being told by an oracle only that the input is indeed in the language (i.e., just one
bit information). That is, during a zero-knowledge interactive proof, the verifier can
obtain no additional knowledge except the one bit information. More formally, an
interactive proof system is called zero-knowledge if there exits a polynomial-time
simulator such that the simulator’s output is indistinguishable from the verifier’s
view of the interactive proof.
After the introduction of zero-knowledge interactive proofs, several variants of
zero-knowledge interactive proofs (ZKIPs) were defined from various viewpoints as
follows:
v Types of indistinguishability: perfect ZKIPs (PZKIPs), statistical ZKIPs
(SZKIPs), and computational ZKIPs (CZKIPs) [GMW86, BCC88, For89,
GMR89]. Roughly speaking, if interactive proof (P, V) (P, prover; V, verifier) is
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2 More generally, a measure for the amount of knowledge released during an interactive proof was
introduced as knowledge complexity in their STOC’85 paper. Some modified definitions of knowledge
complexity were given by [GP91].
PZKIPSZKIPCZKIP, (for any V*) there exits a polynomial time simulator MV*
such that the output of MV* is perfectlystatisticallycomputationally indistinguishable
from V ’s view of the conversation between P and V.) (Informally speaking, two
random variables are perfectlystatisticallycomputationally indistinguishable if they
are identicalalmost-identicalequivalent with respect to (nonuniform) polynomial
time machines.)
v Types of verifiers in simulation. Honest verifier ZKIPs and any (dishonest)
verifier ZKIPs. The latter have two variants: auxiliary input ZKIPs and black
box-simulation ZKIPs [Ore87, For89, AH91, GMR89]. In honest verifier ZKIPs,
the zero-knowledge property can be guaranteed under the condition that the
verifier follows the specification of the protocol, while, in any (dishonest) verifier
ZKIPs (or ZKIPs under the standard definition), the zero-knowledge property can
be guaranteed even if the verifier deviates from the specification of the protocol.
v Types of verifier’s messages: Private-coin SKIPs and public-coin ZKIPs
[GS89, For89, AH91]. In public-coin ZKIPs, verifier’s messages are just coin
flips of the verifier, while in private-coin ZKIPs (or ZKIPs under the standard
definition), verifier’s messages are function values of coin flips (the entropies of the
function values can be less than those of the coin flips).
In characterizing the languages that have zero-knowledge proofs there have been
several fundamental and natural open questions regarding these variants of
zero-knowledge proofs.
In particular, it would be very useful if a class of languages having a special type
of zero-knowledge proofs is equivalent to a class of languages that has a more
general type of zero-knowledge proofs. This is because, if it is true, we need
consider only the specific type of zero-knowledge proof, not the more general type,
when we investigate a class of languages that has the general type of zero-
knowledge proofs.
For example, if a class of languages, all of which have public-coin and
honest-verifier zero-knowledge proofs, is equivalent to a class of languages, all of
which have general type (including private-coin and dishonest verifier)
zero-knowledge proofs, then we need consider only public-coin and honest-verifier
zero-knowledge proofs when we investigate the class of of languages which have
general type zero-knowledge proofs. This would greatly help our investigation
because public-coin and honest-verifier zero-knowledge proofs are much easier to
construct or to transform than the general type.
We can summarize the problems from this viewpoint as follows:
1. Honest verifier ZKIP vs any (dishonesthonest) verifier ZKIP. If L has a
(computational, statistical, perfect) zero-knowledge proof against an honest verifier,
does L have a (resp., computational, statistical, perfect) zero-knowledge proof
against any verifier?
2. Public coin ZKIP vs private coin ZKIP. If L has a (computational,
statistical, perfect) zero-knowledge private-coin proof, does L have a (resp.,
computational, statistical, perfect) zero-knowledge public-coin proof?
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3. ZKIP vs co-ZKIP. If L has a (computational, statistical, perfect) zero-
knowledge proof, does the complement of L have a (resp., computational, statistical,
perfect) zero-knowledge proof?
4. Bounded round ZKIP vs unbounded round ZKIP. If L has an unbounded
( polynomial number of round ) (computational, statistical, perfect) zero-knowledge
proof, does L have a constant round (resp., computational, statistical, perfect)
zero-knowledge proof against an honest verifier?
5. Black-box simulation ZKIP vs auxiliary input ZKIP. If L has a (computa-
tional, statistical, perfect) auxiliary-input zero-knowledge proof, does L have a
(resp., computational, statistical, perfect) black-box simulation zero-knowledge
proof?
As for computational zero-knowledge proofs (i.e., the transformation from a type
of computational ZKIP to another type of computational ZKIP), if we can assume
the existence of a one-way function, most of these problems have been solved
affirmatively, since any L in PSPACE has a (black-box simulation) computa-
tional zero-knowledge public coin proof against any verifier [IY87, B+ 88]. Note
that the problem regarding bounded round vs unbounded round does not seem to
have been solved affirmatively, since some languages (e.g., co-NP) in PSPACE
require unbounded (nonconstant) rounds even if zero-knowledgeness is not
required, unless the polynomial time hierarchy collapses to the second level
[BHZ87, GS89].
As for statistical zero-knowledge proofs, (i.e., the transformation from a type of
statistical ZKIP to another type of statistical ZKIP), these problems remained
open.
1.2. Previous Results
We survey previous results regarding these problems with regard to statistical
zero-knowledge interactive proofs (SZKIPs).
1. Honest verifier SZKIP vs any (dishonesthonest) verifier SZKIP. Bellare et
al. [BMO90] have proven that honest verifier SZKIP class and any verifier SZKIP
class are equivalent udder a number theoretic assumption (i.e., the difficulty of the
discrete logarithm). Ostrovsky et al. [OVY93] have proven it under a more general
assumption, the existence of one-way permutations. However, if we require no com-
putational assumption, only the restricted results obtained by Damga# rd and others
[Dam93] are known: they have shown that it is true for a constant round and
public coin proof.3 The first transformation of [DGOW95] has a property similar
to [Dam93], (i.e., it is applied only to a constant round and public coin proof4),
but the round complexity of the transformed protocol is much lower than that in
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3 Their transformations also preserve perfect zero-knowledgeness, and [Dam93] can be applied to the
argument model. The round complexity of the first transformation in [DGOW95] is much lower than
that by [Dam93].
4 Their transformation also preserves perfect zero-knowledgeness, but cannot be applied to the
argument model.
[Dam93]. The second transformation of [DGOW95] can be applied to arbitrary
number of round and public coin protocols, although it assumes the existence of
one-way functions. Recently, Goldreich et al. [GSV98] solved the problem (the
restriction of round complexity) of [Dam93, DGOW95]; i.e., their transformation
can be applied to public coin protocols with no restriction of round complexity and
no computational assumption. Therefore, this problem has remained open for
general (unrestricted) protocols such as a private coin protocol with no restriction
of round complexity and no computational assumption.
2. Public coin SZKIP vs private coin SZKIP. For interactive proofs which
are not restricted to zero-knowledge, Goldwasser and Sipser proved that they are
equivalent with respect to languages [GS89]. (i.e., public coin IP = private coin
IP.) As for SZKIP, however, no result on this problem has been reported.
3. SZKIP vs co-SZKIP. Some known typical languages which have
statistical (perfect) zero-knowledge proofs support the equivalence of SZKIP and
co-SZKIP with respect to languages. That is, both the graph isomorphism and
graph nonisomorphism problems have statistical (perfect) zero-knowledge proofs,
and both the quadratic residue and quadratic nonresidue problems have statistical
(perfect) zero-knowledge proofs. On the other hand, Fortnow [For89] and Aiello
and Ha# stad [AH91] have proven that if L has a statistical zero-knowledge proof,
then the complement of L has a constant round public-coin proof, which does not
seem to be a zero-knowledge proof (i.e., transformation from SZKIP for L to IP
for L ). No result, however, on this problem (i.e., transformation from SZKIP for
L to SZKIP for L ) has been reported.
4. Bounded round SZKIP vs unbounded round SZKIP. Aiello and Ha# stad
[AH91] have proven that if L has a statistical zero-knowledge proof, then L has
a constant round public-coin proof, which does not seem to be a zero-knowledge
proof (i.e., transformation from SZKIP to constant-round IP). No result, however,
on this problem (i.e., transformation from SZKIP to constant-round SZKIP) has
been reported.
5. Black-box simulation SZKIP vs auxiliary input SZKIP. Since all known
concrete SZKIPs are black-box simulation SZK, we have known no language
which has an auxiliary input SZKIP but has no black-box simulation SZKIP.
Therefore, this fact supports the equivalence of black-box simulation SZKIP and
auxiliary input SZKIP with respect to languages. No result, however, on this
problem has been reported.
1.3. Results of This Paper
This paper generally solves the above-mentioned problems regarding statistical
ZKIPs affirmatively.
This paper proves two main theorems and several corollaries as follows:
Theorem 1. If L has a statistical zero-knowledge interactive proof against an
honest verifier, then L has a statistical zero-knowledge public-coin interactive proof
against an honest verifier.
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This theorem solves Problem 2 with an honest verifier of the transformed
protocol.
Theorem 2. If L has a statistical zero-knowledge public-coin interactive proof
against an honest verifier then the complement of L has a statistical zero-knowledge
constant (one) round interactive proof against an honest verifier.5
This theorem solves Problem 3 with a public-coin original protocol and an
honest verifier of the transformed protocol. This also gives a solution related to
Problem 4.
Corollary 3. If L has a statistical zero-knowledge interactive proof against an
honest verifier, then L has a statistical zero-knowledge public-coin interactive proof
against any verifier.
This corollary solves Problems 1 and 2.
Corollary 4. If L has a statistical zero-knowledge interactive proof against an
honest verifier, then the complement of L has a statistical zero-knowledge constant
(one) round interactive proof against an honest verifier.6
This corollary solves Problem 3 with an honest verifier of the transformed
protocol.
Corollary 5. If L has a statistical zero-knowledge interactive proof against an
honest verifier, then the complement of L has a statistical zero-knowledge public-coin
interactive proof against any verifier.
This corollary solves Problem 3 under the one-way function assumption.
Corollary 6. If L has a statistical zero-knowledge interactive proof against
an honest verifier, then L has a statistical zero-knowledge constant (one) round
interactive proof against an honest verifier.7
This corollary solves Problem 4 with an honest verifier of the transformed
protocol.
Corollary 7. If L has a statistical auxiliary-input zero-knowledge interactive
proof, then L has a statistical black box-simulation zero-knowledge interactive proof.
This corollary solves Problem 5.
1.4. New Techniques
To prove the two main theorems in this paper, we developed three new key
techniques: complementary usage of messages and sequentially recursive hashing for
Theorem 1 and restricted simulation-based prover for Theorem 2.
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5 Note that this theorem can be proven by another approach [SV97] presented after our result
[Oka96], in which a complete (promise) problem for statistical zero-knowledge proofs is used.
6 Note that Fortnow’s theorem [For89] can be proved by using this corollary and [GS89]. In other
words, this paper contains another corrected proof of this theorem.
7 Note that the result by Aiello and Ha# stad [AH91] can be proved by using this corollary and
[GS89]. In other words, this paper contains another proof of their result.
Our transformation protocol in Theorem 1 is based on the idea of the Goldwasser
Sipser protocol [GS89]. However, their protocol may not be zero-knowledge since
it leaks some information regarding the complexity of messages8 of the original
protocol. By utilizing a new technique, complementary usage of messages, we can
construct a transformation protocol without revealing any information about
message complexity.
In addition, in the complementary usage of messages technique, it is necessary to
force the prover to send ‘‘good’’ dummy messages to the verifier. To achieve this,
another new technique, sequentially recursive hashing, is introduced. This is a kind
of interactive hashing protocol in which a series of messages in a domain are output
and checked. This technique guarantees that the initial message of this series is
good.
The transformation protocol in thee proof of Theorem 2 is based on the transfor-
mation technique given in [For89]. However, the straightforward application of
this technique has a flaw similar to that pointed out in [GOP94]. To overcome this
flaw, the other new key technique, restricted simulation-based prover, is used to
exclude low weight conversations from the candidate messages in replying to the
verifier.
2. NOTATIONS AND CONVENTIONS
2.1. Interactive Proofs
This paper follows the standard definitions and concepts regarding interactive
proofs and statistical zero-knowledge, which are, for example, introduced in
[AH91, For89, GMR89, GS89]. (Note that some notations will be used differently
in this paper.)
Let P, the prover, be a probabilistic Turing machine which has a communication
tape (for the formal definition of a communication tape see [GMR89]). P has no
resource bounds. Let V, the verifier, be a probabilistic polynomial time Turing
machine with a communication tape. Let (P, V ) denote an interactive prover
verifier pair: P and V share the input tape and the communication tapes, and interact
in rounds in the following way:
1. The verifier, V, makes a probabilistic polynomial time computation based
on the input, the contents of its memory, and all messages thus far received over
the communication tape from the prover, P.
2. V transmits the results of the computation over the communication tape to
P. We denote the message sent by V in round i by :i .
3. P performs a probabilistic computation based on the input and all
messages thus far received over the communication tape from V.
4. P transmits the results of the computation over the communication tape to
V. We denote the message sent by P in round i by ;i .
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8 When X is a random variable, the complexity of X in this paper denotes log *[x | x is a possible
element of X], where *Z denotes the number of the elements of set Z.
Messages in the conversation between prover P and verifier V will be described by
:1 , ;1 , :2 , ;2 , ..., :k , ;k ,
where :1 may eventually be empty (i.e., a null string). Let x be the common input
between P and V and r be the coin flips of V. Then,
V(x, r, ;1 , ..., ;i&1)  (:1 , ..., :i)
denotes that V outputs its i round messages on input x, r and ;1 , ..., ;i&1 .
(P, V ) is called public-coin when V ’s messages, (:1 , ..., :k), are just coin flips of V.
Otherwise, it is called private-coin.
(P, V ) is called k round if the conversation of (P, V ) is (:1 , ;1 , :2 , ;2 , ..., :k , ;k).
k is bounded by a polynomial in the length of the input, x. If k is a constant, (P, V )
is called bounded round and otherwise unbounded round.
An interactive proververifier pair, (P, V ), forms an interactive proof system for
a language L if and only if
1. If x # L, then Pr[(P, V )(x) accepts]1&12n.
2. If x  L, then for any P*, Pr[(P*, V )(x) accepts]12n.
Here n=|x|.
2.2. Zero-Knowledge
Let S be a probabilistic Turing machine (simulator) to simulate V ’s view of the
conversation between P and V, where V ’s view consists of all messages between P
and V, the random coin flips of V, and an auxiliary input. S(x) denotes a random
variable of S’s output with the common input, x, and View(P, V )(x) denotes a ran-
dom variable of V ’s view of the conversation between P and V with the common
input, x.
Given two parameterized distributions A(x) and B(x), we let PrA(x)( y) and
PrB(x)( y) denote the probability of y according to the distributions, respectively.
We use the following convention.
A(x) is statistically close to B(x) (or A(x) and B(x) are statistically
indistinguishable) if
:
y
| Pr
A(x)
( y)& Pr
B(x)
( y)|<=( |x| ).
(We also call y |PrA(x) ( y)&PrB(x) ( y)| the statistical distance of A(x) and B(x).)
Here,
f (n)<=(n)
denotes
f (n)<1nc
54 TATSUAKI OKAMOTO
for any constant c and sufficiently large n. We say that f (n) is negligible (in n), if
f (n)<=(n). Similarly,
f (n)>1&=(n)
denotes
f (n)>1&1nc
for any constant c and sufficiently large n. We say that f (n) is overwhelming (in n)
if f (n)>1&=(n).
(P, V ) is statistical zero-knowledge against an honest verifier if for an honest
verifier V, there exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator S such that for all
x # L, View(P, V )(x) is statistically close to S(x). Here, an honest verifier V follows
the specification of the protocol, (P, V ). (S can thus be constructed by using this
known specification of V.)
(P, V ) is statistical auxiliary-input zero-knowledge if for any polynomial time
verifier V*, there exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator SV* such that for
all x # L and for any auxiliary-input, y, View(P, V( y))(x) is statistically close to
S(x, y).
(P, V ) is ‘‘statistical’’ ‘‘black-box simulation’’ zero-knowledge if there exists a
probabilistic polynomial time simulator S such that for all x # L and for any poly-
nomial time verifier V*, View(P, V*)(x) is statistically close to S V*(x), where SV*
denotes S using V* as a black box, and S can reset V* and load random bits onto
V*’s random tape.
Note that in the proofs in this paper, we assume that S is strictly polynomial
time. However, our results in this paper can also be derived, even when S is
expected polynomial time, by using an argument similar to that in [AH91].
Let
S(x, w)  X
denote that S produces simulated conversation X using, w, the coin flips of S. Thus,
X is of the form (:1 , ;1 , ..., :k , ;k). The first j (1 jk) round of conversation X
is denoted by X( j); i.e.,
X( j )=(:1 , ;1 , ..., :j , ;j).
Similarly,
Y( j)=(:1 , ;1 , ..., :j).
It is also denoted by
S(x, w)  (X( j ), V ), S(x, w)  (Y( j ), V ),
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where, V denotes one of all possible remaining simulated conversations after X( j )
or Y( j ). We also use the following notation to explicitly describe the simulated
random coin flips of V,
S(x, w)  (X; r), S(x, w)  (X( j ), V ; r), S(x, w)  (Y( j ), V ; r),
where S produces a simulated conversation X (or X( j ), Y( j )) and the random coin
flips of V. (X( j ), r) and (Y( j ), r) are outputs of S such that S(x, w)  (X( j ), V ; r)
and S(x, w)  (Y( j ), V ; r).
Let n=|x| be the size of the common input, x, of (P, V ), k be the number of
rounds of (P, V ), d be the number of coin flips of simulator S for (P, V ), and g be
the number of coin flips of V. Let mj be the size of X( j ) of (P, V ), qj be the size
of Y( j ) of (P, V ), and lj be be the size of :j of (P, V ). All of these quantities are
bounded by polynomials of n.
We will construct an interactive proof (P$, V$) from (P, V ). We use the same
notations as for (P$, V$) but simply add a prime mark. For example, (d $, g$, mj$ , qj$ ,
l j$ , X$( j ), Y$( j ), S$, r$, w$) for (P$, V$).9
In the condition of interactive proof for L, accept error probability 12n is called
error probability. We can decrease the error probability in the statistical zero-
knowledge protocol to 2&n
t
for any constant t by repeating the protocol many times
and adopting the majority of decisions (acceptancerejection) and the modified
protocol is still statistical zero-knowledge. Then,
1. If x # L, then Pr[(P, V )(x) accepts]1&2&nt.
2. If x  L, then for any P*, Pr[(P*, V )(x) accepts]12&nt.
Here, we assume the error probability is 2&n (i.e., t=1).
2.3. Other Notations
In this paper, we often use (x, y) to indicate the concatenation of x and y (e.g.,
a value to be hashed by a random linear function, HI).
The following functions, Nsim( } ) and Nver( } ), play important roles in analyzing
the protocols. Note that, in this paper, the base of a log is always 2, and *Z
denotes the number of the elements of set Z.
v Nsim(X( j )) is the logarithm (size) of the number of coin flips, w, of
simulator S, where S(x, w)  (X( j ), V ); i.e.,
Nsim(X( j ))=log *[w | S(x, w)  (X( j ), V )].
v Nver(X( j )) is the logarithm (size) of the number of coin flips, r, of verifier
V simulated by S, where S(x, w)  (X( j ), V ; r); i.e.,
Nver(X( j ))=log *[r | _w[S(x, w)  (X( j ), V ; r)]].
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9 Without loss of generality, we can assume that dn, since if d<n, we can modify the original
protocol by adding a procedure for S to flip dummy coins.
We also use the notation, Nsim(X( j )), to denote the expected value of Nsim(X( j )),
where the distribution of X( j ) is that of the corresponding part of S’s output (i.e.,
the distribution is taken over w, the coin flips of S).
The symbol | is used for describing a condition for a variable. For example,
x | f (x)=1 means x that satisfies f (x)=1. The symbol _ is employed to indicate
the size of a matrix (e.g., 3_5 matrix). If we use this symbol differently, we
explicitly describe the usage.
When x is defined as an element (variable) of a set, we say x is randomly
selected, iff x is uniformly selected from the set. For example, when x is known to
be an element of [0, 1]b from the context, we say x is randomly selected or random
x is picked iff x is uniformly selected from [0, 1]b. On the other hand, when x is
defined as a random variable with distribution D, we say x is randomly selected iff
x is randomly selected according to distribution D. For example, we say a
simulated conversation (or messages), X(i ), is randomly selected iff X(i ) is ran-
domly selected according to the simulator’s distribution (i.e., X(i ) is selected as an
output of the simulator with uniformly selected coin flips, w, of the simulator). If
the meaning of randomly selected can be distinguished from the context, we do not
describe the distinction explicitly.
When x is defined as an element (variable) of a set, we say x is statistically
randomly selected iff the distribution of the selected x is statistically close to the
uniformly distribution over the set. On the other hand, when x is defined as a ran-
dom variable with distribution D, we say x is statistically randomly selected iff the
distribution of the selected x is statistically close to distribution D. (We often use
the same symbol, x, for the original random variable and the other variable which
is statistically randomly selected, if there is no fear of confusion.)
2.4. Inequalities of Probability Theory
In this paper, the following inequalities of probability theory [Hoe63, Gol95] are
often used.
v Chebychev’s inequality ( pairwise independent sampling). If X1 , X2 , ..., Xn
are pairwise independent random variables with the same expectation + and
variance _2, then
Pr _} :
n
i=1
Xi n&+ }$&_2($2n).
v Hoeffding inequality. If X1 , X2 , ..., Xn are n independent random variables
with identical probability distribution, each ranging over the (real) interval [a, b],
and + is the expectation of the distribution, then
Pr _} :
n
i=1
Xi n&+ }$&e&2n $2(b&a)2.
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2.5. Lower and Upper Bound Protocols
Let H be a (k+1)_b Boolean matrix, where N=( H1h2 ), H1 is a k_b Boolean
matrix, and h2 is a b-bit vector. Let H: [0, 1]k  [0, 1]b be defined by matrix
multiplication and vector addition modulo 2, H(x)=xH1+h2 . Note that, in this
paper, we use the same notation, H, for a Boolean matrix and the induced linear
transformation.
Lower bound protocol. Suppose C[0, 1]k, where membership in C is testable
in polynomial time. Given the description of C and a positive integer b as common
input for P and V, the protocol P proves |C |2b (lower bound protocol) is as
follows [Bab85, Sip83, AH91]:
1. V picks a random (k+1)_b matrix H and a random element z of [0, 1]b.
V sends H and z to P.
2. P responds with c # [0, 1]k.
3. V accepts if c # C and H(c)=z.
Lemma 8. If P plays optimally then
1. Pr[V accepts]1&2b|C |.
2. Pr[V accepts]|C |2b.
Upper bound protocol. Suppose that an element in C can be selected uniformly
by V. Given the description of C and a positive integer b as common input for P
and V, the protocol P proves |C |2b (upper bound protocol) is as follows [For89]:
1. V picks a random (k+1)_b matrix H and a random element c of C.
V then calculates H(c)=z. V sends H and z to P.
2. P sends a to V.
3. V accepts if a=c.
Lemma 9. If P plays optimally then
1. Pr[V accepts]1&(|C |&1)2b.
2. Pr[V accepts]d2b( |C |&1), where d=3+- 5.
3. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
3.1. Informal Proof Sketch of Theorem 1
In this proof, we will transform a private-coin SZKIP, (P, V ) for L, to a public-
coin SZKIP, (M, A) for L.
First, let us focus on 1-round protocols as (P, V ). That is, V sends P a message,
:, of length l and uses a random tape of length g. P then sends V a message, ;, and
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V decides whether to accept ; or not. Here, for simplicity of explanation, we
assume that all :’s by V have the same weight, c, where the weight of : is
c:=log *R: .
Here, R:=[r | V(x, r)  :], so let the complexity of : be b, i.e., b=log *[:]. Then
b+c= g,
since 2c } 2b=2 g.
In the GoldwasserSipser (GS) protocol [GS89], the prover sends b*=b&$
(e.g., b* is around b, since $ is much smaller than b) to the verifier. The lower
bound protocol for : with parameter b* (in which the prover proves *[:]2b*)
is then executed, and :~ is determined through the lower bound protocol. Next, :~ ,
; , and c*=c&$ (e.g., c* is around c) are sent to the verifier from the prover.
Finally, in order to check the weight of :~ , the lower bound protocol r~ # R:~ is
executed with parameter c*. The verifier checks whether V(x, r~ , ; ) accepts,
V(x, r~ )  :~ , and b*+c* is close to g.
In the GS protocol, however, the information, b* (and c*), may not be
simulatable by a polynomial time bounded algorithm, even if the original protocol
(P, V ) is zero-knowledge. Therefore, in order to construct a zero-knowledge public-
coin protocol, we have to introduce a new technique to replace the use of b* (and
c*). For this purpose, our protocol, (M, A), uses the weight of dummy message :(1).
Here, we call this technique the complementary usage of messages.
The protocol using the complementary usage of messages technique tries to prove
that the number of messages satisfying a certain condition is about 2b without
disclosing b. Denote the set of such messages by M. The point is that disclosing a
complementary set C of size 2 g&b where g is a known parameter will do the job
required. That is, we just prove that the size of M_C is at least 2 g, where _ means
the product of two sets. The point is that it is easy to produce C, namely the set
of verifier’s coins giving a dummy message, :(1). Here note that C is defined by
fixing :(1).
Therefore, in place of the lower bound protocol for :~ with parameter b* in the
GS protocol, we will use the lower bound protocol for (:~ , r(1)) with parameter g*
(g* is around g). That is, in our protocol, V ’s random tape length, g, which is
known to the verifier and simulator, and dummy message :(1) with weight g&b are
used in place of b. In other words, in our lower bound protocol, complexity b is
reserved for :~ by using the weight of dummy message :(1) in a complementary
manner, since complexity (g&b) is supplied by r(1) and the total required
complexity is g.
Similarly, in place of the lower bound protocol for r~ # R:~ with parameter c* (e.g.,
around c), we will use the lower bound protocol for (:(2), r~ ) with parameter g*.
Here, the complexity c is reserved for r~ # R:~ by using the complexity of :(2) in a
complementary manner.
Based on this idea, we can construct a naive zero-knowledge transformation
prototype, (M, A), using the simulator, S, of (P, V ) as follows:
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1. M sends a dummy message, :(1), to A.
2. A selects a random (l+ g+1)_(g&$) matrix H1 , and a (g&$)-bit
random string z1 . A sends H1 , and z1 to M.
3. M sends :~ , ; , and w(Y ) to A.
4. A checks that
S(x, w(Y ))  (:(1), V ; r(1)),
H1(:~ , r(1))=z1 .
In addition, A checks the correctness of S’s output (i.e., whether V(x, r(1))=:(1)).
If they are correct, A selects a random (l+ g+1)_(g&$) matrix H2 and a
(g&$)-bit random string z2 . A sends H2 and z2 to M.
5. M sends w(X ) and w~ to A.
6. A checks that
S(x, w(X ))  (:(2), r(2)),
S(x, w~ )  (:~ , ; ; r~ ),
H2(:(2), r~ )=z2 .
In addition, A checks the correctness of S’s output (i.e., whether V(x, r(2))=:(2),
V(x, r~ )=:~ , and V(x, r~ , ; ) accepts).
Note that the above-mentioned protocol uses a simulated interactive proof
(P, V ) (e.g., the output of S). Therefore, the weight and complexity of : are defined
not over the real (P, V ) but over the simulated (P, V ). (When x # L, from statistical
zero-knowledgeness, those over the simulated (P, V ) are statistically close to those
over the real (P, V ).) Therefore, we should introduce the weight of a message
regarding the coin flips, w, of the simulator, S, as well as that regarding the coin
flips, r, of V. Here, the weight regarding w is called the w-weight, and the other is
the r-weight. For example, w-weight of r is defined by log *[w | S(x, w)  ( V ; r)].
Appendix A shows a proof that the above-mentioned naive transformation
protocol works, under the assumption that all simulated messages :’s have the same
r-weight (in both cases of x # L and x  L) and that all r output by S have the same
w-weight. Then, g+log(1&=(n))b+c g, and f +e g, where b is the com-
plexity of : when x # L, c is the r-weight of : when x # L, f is the complexity of :
when x  L, and e is the r-weight of : when x  L.
In addition, Appendix B shows a more general version of the naive transforma-
tion with k-rounds (e.g., transformation from (P, V ) with k-round to (M, A)). The
protocol works under a similar assumption as follows: for all i=1, ..., k, simulated
messages, :i ’s, given the prefix X(i&1)=(:1 , ;1 , ..., ; i&1), have the same com-
plexity, bi , when x # L, and simulated messages :i ’s, given the prefix X(i&1), have
the same complexity, fi , when x  L. We also assume that simulated prefix conver-
sation Y(i )=(:1 , ;1 , ..., :i) has the same r-weight, ei , and all r output by S have the
same w-weight.
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However, this naive transformation protocol has the following problems, all of
which are due to the nonuniformity of weights (r-weights and w-weights):
v Distribution of message weight. In general, the weight of each message is
different. However, the above-mentioned naive protocol assumes that the weights of
all messages are the same. To solve this problem, we use a parallel execution
version of many (P, V ), which allows us to use the averaged properties bounded by
probability theory (i.e., Hoeffding inequality [Hoe63]). That is, the weights of
messages in a parallel version can still differ, but the weights of almost all messages
lie in a certain range of values.
v Honesty of dummy messages. The key point in the above-mentioned naive
transformation protocol is that the complexities of r(1) and :(2) are complementary
(i.e., their sum is bounded, i.e., at most g). In general, the complexities of r(1) and
:(2) can be very large, although the complexities of the averaged messages are
limited. For example, if the w-weight of :(1) is much larger than the average value
and the w-weight of r(1) is much smaller than the average value, then the complexity
of r(1) can be much larger than the average value. Therefore, in order to restrict the
complexity of r(1), the w-weight of :(1) and the w-weight of r(1) should lie in certain
ranges. Similarly, to restrict the complexity of :(2) the w-weight of :(2) should be
restricted to lie in a certain range. For this purpose, we invent a new technique,
sequentially recursive hashing, to force the prover, M, to select ‘‘good’’ messages
whose weights are in a certain range with high probability.
The transformation protocol, (M, A), consists of two parts, Part I and Part II.
Roughly speaking, Part I forces M to send A ‘‘good’’ dummy messages (e.g., :(1))
whose w-weights are not much larger than the average value with high probability.
For this purpose, the sequentially recursive hashing protocol called WEIGHT-TEST
(Pretest) is used in Part I. The main part (Main-test) of Part II corresponds to the
above-mentioned naive protocol. (See the similarity between Main-test of Part II
protocol and the naive transformation protocol with k rounds in Appendix B.)
WEIGHT-TEST (Posttest) in Part II is also the sequentially recursive hashing
protocol and forces M to send A ‘‘good’’ dummy messages (e.g., r(1) and :(2)) whose
w-weights are not much smaller than the average value with high probability. By
combining WEIGHT-TEST (Pretest) in Part I and WEIGHT-TEST (Posttest) in
Part II, the complexities of r(1) and :(2) are guaranteed to be complementary (i.e.,
their sum is bounded, i.e., at most almost g). This is because the complexity of r(1)
is at most (a&b), where a is the maximum w-weight of :(2) and b is the minimum
w-weight of r(1). The complexity of :(2) is at most (d&c), where d is the random
tape length of simulator S and c is the minimum w-weight of :(2). When these
w-weights are restricted to around average values, (a&b)+(d&c) is limited to
around g, since (a&b) is around the average r-weight of : and (d&c) is around
the average complexity of :. The main part of Part II (naive protocol) proves x # L
under the guarantees offered by the Pretest and Posttest.
A rough idea of the sequentially recursive hashing protocol, WEIGHT-TEST, is
as follows: First M sends initial value X0 to A. M and A, then, repeat the following
procedure sequentially (for I=0, 1, 2, ..., K ); i.e., A receives XI+1 and wI from M
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after A sends random (|X |+1)_(d&\) matrix HI and zI ( # [0, 1]d&\) to M. They
satisfy the following equations:
HI (XI+1 , wI)=zI ,
S(x, wI)  (XI , V ).
Through this sequentially interactive protocol, sequentially recursive hashing, a
series of messages, (X0 , X1 , ..., XK+1), are output. Here, K is bounded by a polyno-
mial of n. For example, in the Part I protocol of (M, A) in the proof of Theorem 1,
K=k4d 3+1. When the distribution of the weight of XI , where the weight is defined
with respect to the coin flips of the simulator, S, is sufficiently averaged by the
parallel execution, this sequence has the following property:
1. Three ranges for the w-weight of XI are defined: HIGH, GOOD, and
LOW. HIGH is the subset of XI whose w-weights are greater than value N+=1 ,
where N is the expected weight value of XI . GOOD is the subset of XI whose
w-weights are less than N+=2 and greater than N&=2 . LOW is the subset of XI
whose w-weights are less than N&=1 . Here, =1>=2>0. For example, in the Part I
protocol of (M, A) in the proof of Theorem 1, =1 is k7d 9 and =2 is k5d 6.
2. Suppose M is honest (i.e., M randomly selects XI among candidate values
satisfying the equations). Then, XK is in GOOD with high probability, when X0 is
in GOOD. In addition, if X0 is randomly (honestly) selected, X0 lies in GOOD
with high probability.
3. Suppose M is dishonest (i.e., M can select any value satisfying the
equation). Even if M uses his full (infinite) power, M can make XK lie in HIGH
with negligible probability, independent of the w-weight value of X0 (i.e., the
w-weight of XK is at most N+=1 with high probability). If X0 is in LOW, for some
iK there will be negligible possibility for Xi (i.e., M can find no value, Xi , satisfying
the equation, for 0<iK with high probability).
We now informally explain why this property holds. Let W be [w], the whole
set of the coin flips, w, of simulator S (*W=2d ). Let H be the subset of w by
which S outputs X in HIGH. Let L be the subset of w by which S outputs X in
LOW. Let G be the subset of w by which S outputs X in GOOD. Let
WT(X )=*[w | S(x, w)  (X, V )]=2w&weight of X. Clearly H and L are minorities
in W and G is a majority in W. For example, *H*W<12 f (n). Therefore,
:
X # HIGH
WT(X )=*H<*W2 f (n).
If XI is in HIGH, then
*[XI+1 | WT(XI+1)WT(XI)] } WT(XI)< :
XI+1 | WT(XI+1)WT(XI )
WT(XI+1)
< :
X # HIGH
WT(X )<*W2 f (n)=2d& f (n).
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To pass the lower bound protocol in the sequentially recursive hashing with high
probability, *[(XI+1 , wI)]=*[XI+1] } *[wI] should be greater than 2d&\. If XI
is in HIGH and WT (XI+1)WT(XI), then *[(XI+1 , wI)] is less than 2d& f (n).
Here, suppose that \< f (n). If XI is in HIGH, then WT(XI+1) should be less than
WT(XI) (Claim 16). Therefore, if K is appropriately selected (at most d ), even if
WT(X0) is very large (X0 is in HIGH), XK should be out of HIGH (i.e.,
WT(XK)<=1) with high probability (Claims 17 and 18). Similarly, if XI is in LOW,
then WT(XI+1) should be less than WT(XI). Hence, if X0 is in LOW, XK should
be empty with high probability (Claim 19). On the other hand,
:
X # GOOD
WT(X )=*G>(1&=(n))*W=(1&=(n)) 2d.
If XI is in GOOD, then
*[XI+1 # GOOD] W4 T(XI)>(1&=(n))*W2&2=2=(1&=(n)) 2d&2=2.
Here suppose that \>2=2 . Then, if XI is in GOOD, then XI+1 can be in GOOD
with high probability (Claim 13).
A strategic remark. We transform private-coin protocol, (P, V ), into public-
coin protocol, (M, A). The simulator of (P, V ) (or simulation based protocol
(P, V )) is basically used, but in this transformed protocol, (M, A), the role of the
verifier, A, is just to flip coins and send the results to M. Therefore, the role of pick-
ing up conversation samples of the simulator should be done by prover M. Note
that this role differs from that in the protocols of [AH91, For89], in which the
verifier runs the simulator and picks up samples.
Moreover, to make (M, A) zero-knowledge, (M, A) should be a simulation-based
protocol. (Otherwise, the prover’s actions may not be simulatable.)
Here, note that the strategy in which A picks conversation samples, X ’s, of the
simulator by selecting coin flips, w’s, of the simulator and sending them to M is
bad, since such samples may not be used in certain simulation-based protocols
(because it can be difficult to find two w1 and w2 which make the simulator output
the same conversation, X; i.e., the protocol may not be simulatable).
3.2. Transformation Protocol
Transformation from (P, V ) to (M, A). Let (P, V ) be a statistical zero-
knowledge proof against an honest verifier, V, for language L. We will construct a
statistical zero-knowledge public-coin proof, (M, A), for an honest verifier, A, for L.
Let x be the input to (P, V ), n=|x|, and k be the number of rounds of (P, V )(x),
where k<nc for a constant c for sufficient large n.
We construct a statistical zero-knowledge proof (P$, V$) from (P, V ) by running
(P, V ) k9d 9 times in parallel, where d is the random tape length of simulator S for
(P, V ). Let g be the random tape length of V. V$ accepts if all individual protocols
are accepted. Let S$ be the simulator for (P$, V$), which simply executes S in
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parallel, d $ be the random tape length of S$, and g$ be the random tape length of
V$. Then,
1. If x # L, then Pr[(P$, V$)(x) accepts](1&2&n)k9d 9>1&=(n).
2. If x  L, then for any P*, Pr[(P$*, V$)(x) accepts]12k9d9n.
Before we formally describe the protocol, let us dispose of the trivial cases when
x  L. Thus, we assume that the simulator, S$, outputs valid conversations in which
the simulated conversations are consistent with the simulated coin flips of the
verifier and the verifier accepts the simulated conversations with overwhelming
probability, even if x  L.
We now show the protocol of (M, A). Before describing the main part of (M, A),
we show the subroutines of the protocol.
[WEIGHT-TEST]
Parameters: (S, K, XI , m, d, $)
S : simulator.
K : number of repetitions.
XI : output of S, S(x, wI)  (XI , V ) (I=0, 1, ..., K&1), where wI is coin flips
for S.
m : size of XI .
d : size of wI .
$ : margin of random hashing.
Input: X0
Output: XK
Repeat the following protocol for I from 0 to K&1 sequentially (K times).
1. A selects a random (m+d+1)_(d&$) matrix, HI , and a (d&$)-bit
random string, zI . A sends HI and zI to M.
2. M finds wI and vI+1 such that
HI (XI+1 , wI)=zI , (1)
S(x, wI)  (XI , V ), (2)
S(x, vI+1)  (XI+1 , V ). (3)
If there are many candidates for (wI , vI+1), one is randomly selected (then,
XI+1 is determined by vI+1).10 If M cannot find such (wI , vI+1), then M
sends ‘‘give up’’ to A and halts. Otherwise, M sends XI+1 and wI to A.
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10 In this paper, when coin flips of S (and S$) are sent outside a party, notation w (and w$) is used
as the coin flips, while when coin flips of S (and S$) are used only inside a party, v (and v$) is used as
the coin flips. For example, in this protocol, wI is sent to A, but vI+1 is not revealed to A. Since one
of many possible values of vI+1 is (uniformly) randomly selected, XI+1 is selected randomly on the
distribution of S’s output. In other words, vI+1 is used for M to determine XI+1 according to the dis-
tribution of S, and XI+1 (but not vI+1) is sent to A in this round (the Ith round). In the next round
(the (I+1)th round), wI+1 is determined and sent to A (wI+1 {vI+1 with high probability when there
are many candidates of vI+1 in the Ith round).
3. A checks whether XI+1 and wI (along with XI) satisfy Eqs. (1) and (2). If
they do not hold, A halts.
[End of WEIGHT-TEST]
We next describe the protocol of (M, A). The protocol consists of two parts,
Part I and Part II. Part I outputs X $(i )( j ) (i=3, ..., k+1; j=1, ..., i&2) and Y $(i )(i )
(i=i, ..., k). They are ‘‘good’’ dummy messages with high probability and are input
to Part II.
Protocol (M , A )
Common input: x
What to prove: x # L.
[Part I]
1. Repeat the following protocol for i from 3 to k+1, and j from 1 to i&2.
The repetitions are done using independently chosen random bits.
(a) M flips coins, v$0 , for simulator S$ to obtain a simulated conversation
X $0( j ) such that
S$(x, v$0)  (X $0( j ), V ).
M sends X $0( j ) to A.
(b) (M, A) executes WEIGHT-TEST (‘‘Pretest’’), which outputs X $(i )( j ),
as follows:
[WEIGHT-TEST] (Pretest)
Parameters: (S$, k4d 3+1, X $I ( j ), mj$ , d $, 17k5d 6)
Input: X $0( j)
Output: X $k4d3+1( j ) (as X $(i )( j ))
2. Repeat the following protocol for i from 1 to k. The repetitions are done
using independently chosen random bits.
(a) M flips coins, v$0 , for simulator S$ to obtain a simulated conversation
Y $0(i ) such that
S$(x, v$0)  (Y $0(i ), V ).
M sends Y $0(i ) to A.
(b) (M, A) executes WEIGHT-TEST (‘‘Pretest’’), which outputs Y $(i )(i ), as
follows:
[WEIGHT-TEST] (Pretest)
Parameters: (S$, k4d 3+1, Y $I (i ), qj$ , d $, 17k5d 6)
Input: Y $0(i )
Output: Y $k4d3+1(i ) (as Y $ (i )(i ))
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[Part II]
1. (Main-test)
Let lj be the size of :j$ ( j=1, ..., k) of (P$, V$) and Li=l1+l2+ } } } +li .
Repeat the following protocol for i from 1 to k+1 sequentially.
(a) A selects a random (Li+ g$+1)_(g$&17(k+1) k5d 6) matrix H i$ and
a (g$&17(k+1) k5d 6)-bit random string zi$ . A sends H i$ and zi$ to M.
(b) M finds w$ (i )(X ), 1 , w$
(i )
(X ), 2 , ..., w$
(i )
(X ), i&1 , w$
(i)
(Y ) and v~ $
(i ) (and w~ $ only when
i=k+1) such that
H i$ ((:$ (i )1 , :$
(i )
2 , ..., :$
(i )
i&1), :~ i$ , r$
(i )) = zi$ , (4)
S$(x, w$ (i )(X ), 1)  (:$
(i )
1 , V ), (5)
S$(x, w$ (i )(X ), 2)  (X $
(i)(1), :$ (i )2 , V ), (6)
} } }
S$(x, w$ (i )(X ), i&1)  (X $
(i)(i&2), :$ (i )i&1 , V ), (7)
S$(x, w$ (i )(Y ))  (Y $
(i)(i ), V ; r$(i )), (8)
S$(x, v~ $(i ))  (:~ $1 , ; $1 , ..., ; $i&1 , :~ i$ , V ), (9)
S$(x, w~ $)  (:~ $1 , ; $1 , ..., :~ $k , ; $k ; r~ $), (10)
where (:$ (i )1 , :$
(i )
2 , ..., :$
(i )
i&1) for i=1, and :~ $k+1 are null strings, and
r$(k+1)=r~ $. If there are many candidates for w$ (i )(X ), 1 , w$
(i )
(X ), 2 , ...,
w$ (i )(X ), i&1 , w$
(i )
(Y ) and v~ $
(i) (and w~ $ only when i=k+1), one is randomly
selected. If M cannot find such w$ (i )(X ), 1 , w$
(i )
(X ), 2 , ..., w$
(i )
(X ), i&1 , w$
(i )
(Y ) and
v~ $(i ), then M sends ‘‘give up’’ to A and halts. Otherwise, M selects ; i$
randomly based on the distribution of S$. M sends (w$ (i)(X ), 1 , w$
(i )
(X ), 2 , ...,
w$ (i )(X ), i&1 , w$
(i )
(Y )), and (:~ i$ , ; i$) to A, when 1k. When i=k+1, (w$
(k+1)
(X ), 1 ,
w$ (k+1)(X ), 2 , ..., w$
(k+1)
(X ), k ), and w~ $ to A.
(c) A checks whether (w$ (i )(X ), 1 , w$
(i )
(X ), 2 , ..., w$
(i )
(X ), i&1 , w$
(i )
(Y ) , :~ i$ , ; i$) (ik) and
(w$ (k+1)(X ), 1 , w$
(k+1)
(X ), 2 , ..., w$
(k+1)
(X ), k , w~ $) (along with the outputs of Part I)
satisfy Eqs. (4)(8) and (10). If they do not hold, then A halts.
2. In addition, :$ (i )j (i=2, ..., k+1; j=1, ..., i&1) and r$
(i ) (i=1, ..., k) must
pass the following test. (M, A) executes WEIGHT-TEST (‘‘Posttest’’) as
follows:
[WEIGHT-TEST] (Posttest)
Parameters: (S$, k4d 3+1, Y $I # [Y $( j )], qj$ , d $, 17k5d 6)
Input: Y $0=(X $(i )( j&1), :$ (i )j )
(Note: X $(i )(0) means a null string.)
Output: Y $k4d3
[WEIGHT-TEST] (Posttest)
Parameters: (S$, k4d 3+1, Z$I # [(Y $(i ), r$)], q j$+ g$, d $, 17k5d 6)11
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11 (Y $(i ), r$) is an output of S$ such that S$(x, w)  (Y $(i ), V ; r$).
Input: Z$0=(Y $(i )(i ), r$ (i ))
Output: Z$k4d3
3. If all checks including the pretests, main-test and posttests are passed
correctly, then A accepts.
[End of Protocol (M , A)]
Note. Since X $(i )( j ) (i=3, ..., k+1; j=1, ..., i&2) are independently generated
in Part I, X $(i )( j1) is independent from (i.e., not a suffix of) X $(i )( j2) when j1< j2 .
3.3. Lemmas for Completeness and Zero-knowledgeness
This subsection shows two closely related lemmas that are used to prove
completeness and zero-knowledgeness.
These lemmas show the randomness of variables generated by a random hashing
protocol (Lemma 12, used mainly for the proof of completeness and zero-
knowledgeness) and also the randomness of the simulated variables of the random
hashing protocol (Lemma 11, used mainly for the proof of zero-knowledgeness).
Before describing these lemmas, we will show a basic property based on the
Hoeffding inequality.
If X $( j ) is randomly selected according to the distribution of S$, by flipping the
coins of S$, then the distribution of X $( j ) is equivalent to the distribution of k9d 9
independently random selections of X( j ) according to the distribution of S. Thus,
we can utilize the Hoeffding inequality [Hoe63] to analyze the distribution of some
variables regarding X $.
The following variables (sizes) are analyzed: Let N(X( j )) be one of Nsim(X( j ))
and Nver(X( j )). Then if X $( j )=(X(1)( j ), X(2)( j ), ..., X(k9d 9)( j )), then
N(X $( j ))=N(X(1)( j ))+N(X(2)( j ))+ } } } +N(X(k9d9)( j )).
Based on this additive property, the Hoeffding inequality can be applied to our
analysis.
Claim 10. If X $( j ) is selected randomly (w.r.t. the coin flips of S$), then
Pr[|Nsim(X $( j ))&Nsim(X $( j ))|<k5d 6]>1&e&2kd,
where Nsim(X $) is the expected value of Nsim(X $).
Proof. Since 0Nsim(X $(t)( j ))d $, from the Hoeffding inequality,
Pr[ |Nsim(X $( j ))&Nsim(X $( j ))|k5d 6]
=Pr[|(Nsim(X $(1)( j ))+ } } } +Nsim(X $(k9d9)( j )))(k9d 9)
&Nsim(X $( j ))|1(k4d 3)]
e&2k9d9(k8d 6d 2)
=e2kd. K
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We now show the two lemmas.
In the real transformed protocol (M, A), given (X $I ( j ), H $I , z$I), (X $I+1( j), w$I) is
calculated by M, while w$I is uniformly selected (with S$(x, w$I)  (X $I ( j ), V )) and
X $I+1( j) is randomly selected according to the distribution of S$, in the simulation. On
the other hand, z$I is calculated by the simulator S , while z$I is uniformly selected by A.
Lemma 11 shows that, given (H $I , X $I), for almost all (H $I , X $I), simulated
z$I=H $I (X $I+1( j ), w$I), where w$I is randomly selected (with S$(x, w$I)  (X $I ( j ), V ))
and X $I+1( j) is randomly selected (according to the distribution of S$), is statisti-
cally close to real z$I , which is uniformly selected by A in the transformed protocol
(M, A). On the other hand, Lemma 12 shows that, given (H $I , X $I), for almost all
(H $I , X $I), simulated (X $I+1( j ), w$I), in which w$I is randomly selected (with
S$(x, w$I)  (X $I ( j ), V )), and X $I+1( j ) is randomly selected according to the distribu-
tion of S$, is statistically close to real (X $I+1( j ), w$I), which is calculated (by M)
through the lower bound protocol in the transformed protocol (M, A).
Lemma 11. Let x # L. Let X $I ( j ) satisfy
|Nsim(X $I ( j))&Nsim(X $I ( j ))|k5d 6.
Given X $I ( j ), let w$I be randomly selected such that
S$(x, w$I)  (X $I ( j ), V ).
Let w$I+1 and H $I be also randomly selected.
Then, given (H $I , X $I ( j )), random variable (over w$I and w$I+1)
z$I=H $I (X $I+1( j ), w$I)
is statistically close to randomly selected z$I , with probability (taken over H $I) greater
than 1&=(n), where
S$(x, w$I+1)  (X $I+1( j ), V ).
Proof. In this proof, we will show that the expected value (over H $I) of the statistical
distance between simulated z$I and uniform z$I is negligible. This implies that
simulated z$I is statistically close to uniform z$I with overwhelming probability (over H $I).
Let C be (X $I+1( j ), w$I), which is a random variable such that
S$(x, w$I)  (X $I ( j ), V ),
S$(x, w$I+1)  (X $I+1( j ), V ),
and whose distribution is based on S$ (with coin flips of w$I and w$I+1). So,
Pr[C | X $I ( j )]=(2Nsim(X
$I+1( j ))2d $)(12Nsim(X $I ( j )))=2Nsim(X $I+1( j ))2d $+Nsim(X $I ( j )).
Let
C=[C | |Nsim(X $I+1( j ))&Nsim(X $I+1( j ))|k5d 6].
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Let b=d $&17k5d 6. Here we restrict variable C to assume values only in C.
(Otherwise, there may exist C with small probability such that Pr[C | X $I ( j )] is
much bigger than the average, and this would hinder the following evaluation.
Since the case satisfying the restriction (C # C) occurs with overwhelming probabil-
ity, it is sufficient to consider the statistical randomness of z$I under this restriction.)
Note that Pr[C | X $I ( j )]22k
5d 6&d $ when C # C, and from Claim 10
1&e&2kd :
C # C
Pr[C | X $I ( j )]1.
Next, we normalize the distribution of set C such that the total probability is 1.
That is, for C # C, let
pC=Pr[C | X $I ( j )]<\ :C # C Pr[C | X $I ( j )]+ .
Then, C # C pC=1, and pC22k
5d6&d $(1&e&2kd)=22k5d 6&d $&log(1&e&2kd ). Hereafter,
log(1&e&2kd) as an additive term will be neglected (i.e., pC22k
5d6&d $).
Given z$I , let
PC, zI={pC0
if H $I (C)=z$I
if H $I (C){z$I .
PC, zI is a random variable with respect to the random selection of H $I . Here, note
that pC is the value of a (kind of weight) function of C. For any C1 {C2 , random
variables of PC1 , zI and PG2 , zI are (pairwise) independent.
We then calculate the expected value (over H $I) of the statistical distance between
simulated z$I over C # C and uniform z$I as follows,
EH $I _:z$I } 2
&b& :
C # C
PC, zI }&=:z$I EH $I _} :C # C (PC, zI&2
&bpC) }&
:
z$I
\EH $I _\C # C (PC, zI&2&bpC)+
2
&+
12
, (11)
where Ea[ ] denotes the expected value with respect to coin flips of a.
By pairwise independence, we expand the square sum as follows:
EH $I _\ :C # C (PC, zI&2
&bpC)+
2
&
= :
C # C
EH $I[(PC, zI&2
&bpC)2]
+ :
C1{C2
EH $I[PC1 , zI&2
&bpC1] EH $I[PC2 , zI&2
&bpC2]
= :
C # C
EH $I[(PC, zI&2
&bpC)2] (12)
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(since EH $I[PC1 , zI]=2
&bpC1). Hence, from Eqs. (11) and (12),
EH $I _\ :C # C (PC, zI&2
&bpC)+
2
&=:z$I \ :C # C EH $I[(PC, zI&2
&bpC)2]+
12
:
z$I
\ :C # C 2
&bp2C+
12
(since EH $I[(PC, zI&2
&bpC)2]=2&b( pC&2&bpC)2+(1&2&b)(0&2&bpC)22&bp2C)
2b2 \maxC # C [ pC] :C # C pC+
12
2(b&(d $&2k
5d6))22&15k
5d62.
The statistical distance between simulated z$I over C # C and (truly) simulated z$I
is negligible, since C lies in C with overwhelming probability. Thus, the expected
value (over H $I) of the statistical distance between simulated z$I and uniform z$I is
negligible. K
Lemma 12. Let x # L. Let X $I ( j ) satisfy
|Nsim(X $I ( j))&Nsim(X $I ( j ))|k5d 6.
Let z$I and H $I be randomly selected.
Given X $I ( j ), let W=(w$I , w$I+1) be randomly selected among the solutions
satisfying
z$I=H $I (X $I+1( j ), w$I),
S$(x, w$I)  (X $I ( j ), V ),
S$(x, w$I+1)  (X $I+1( j ), V ).
Then, given (H $I , X $I ( j )), random variable W (over z$I and the random selection of
W under the above equations) is statistically close to randomly selected (w$I , w$I+1)
where S$(x, w$I)  (X $I ( j), V ), with probability greater than 1&=(n). (The probability
is taken over H $I .)
Proof. We can easily prove this lemma from the result of Lemma 11.
Here we will similarly prove that the expected value (over H $I) of the statistical
distance between W obtained in the lower bound protocol and randomly selected
W (under the restriction that S$(x, w$I)  (X $I ( j ), V )) is negligible.
Given X $I ( j ), H $I and z$I , let
Wz$I=[W=(w$I , w$I+1) | z$I=H $I (X $I+1( j ), w$I) 7 S$(x, w$I)
 (X $I ( j ), V ) 7 S$(x, w$I+1)  (X $I+1( j ), V )].
Then *Wz$I2
&(d $+Nsim(X $I ( j )))=C PC, zI (i.e., the probability that z$I occurs when W
is uniformly distributed).
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On the other hand, the probability that W occurs when z$I is uniformly
distributed is PW=2&b*Wz$I , where W # Wz$I . Hence, given H $I ,
:
W
|PW&2&(d $+Nsim(X
$I ( j )))|=:
z$I
*Wz$I |2
&b*Wz$I&2
&(d $+Nsim(X $I ( j )))|
=:
z$I
|2&b&*Wz$I 2
&(d $+Nsim(X $I ( j )))|
=:
z$I
} 2&b&:C PC, zI } .
Thus, the expected value (over H $I) of the statistical distance between W obtained
in the lower bound protocol and uniform W is exactly the same as the distance
evaluated in Lemma 11; i.e., it is negligible. K
3.4. Proof of Completeness
We assume that x # L. We will now show that (M, A)(x) accepts with probability
greater than 1&=(n). It will be shown that both Part I and Part II succeed with
probability greater than 1&=(n).
Part I
First, we prove that the success possibility of Part I is greater than 1&=(n).
(Note that this property does not depend on whether x # L or not.) To prove this
property, we will show that there exist sufficiently many (XI+1 , wI)’s to pass each
step of WEIGHT-TEST (lower bound protocol) with overwhelming probability. In
addition, it will be shown that thy output of Part I is statistically close to randomly
selected [X $(i )( j ), Y $ (i )(i )] according to the distribution of S$.
Claim 13. Let x # L. Let X $I ( j ) satisfy
|Nsim(X $I ( j))&Nsim(X $( j ))|<k5d 6.
Then if H $I and z$I are randomly selected, (w$I , v$I+1) exists with overwhelming
probability such that
H $I(X $I+1( j ), w$I)=z$I ,
S$(x, w$I)  (X $I ( j ), V ),
S$(x, v$I+1)  (X $I+1( j ), V ),
|Nsim(X $I+1( j ))&Nsim(X $( j ))|<k5d 6.
Here, the probability is taken over H $I and z$I .
Proof. This claim can be proven immediately from Lemma 12 and Claim 10,
since (w$I , v$I+1) should be statistically close to the uniform distribution from
Lemma 12 with overwhelming probability, and X $I+1( j ) with uniform v$I+1 should
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satisfy |Nsim(X $I+1( j ))&Nsim(X $( j ))|<k5d 6 with overwhelming probability from
Claim 10. K
Therefore, from Claims 10 and 13, (w$0 , v$1) satisfying the condition exists with
overwhelming probability, since X $0( j ) and (H $0 , z$0) are randomly selected.
Moreover, since v$1 is randomly selected among the candidates, X $1( j ) is
statistically close to the distribution of S$, from Lemma 12.
So,
Pr[|Nsim(X $1( j ))&Nsim(X $( j ))|<k5d 6]>1&=(n).
Thus, by induction based on Claim 13, M can find (w$I , v$I+1) (I=0, 1, ..., k4d 3+1),
with overwhelming probability.
Moreover, when M does this procedure for X $(i )( j) (i=3, ..., k+1; j=1, ..., i&2)
and for Y $(i )(i ) (i=1, ..., k), the total number of times this procedure is repeated is
k(k&1)2+k<k2. So, the probability that M can complete Part I is also greater
than 1&=(n).
Part II
Now we consider the success possibility of Part II. That is, we will prove that the
success probability of Part II is greater than 1&=(n). (Note that this property
depends on the fact that x # L.)
Here, we consider the complexity (number) of coin flips, r$, of the simulated V $
(i.e., Nver) and the complexity (number) of dummy messages, :$ (i )j , in (P$, V $).
First, we will show that the average r-weight of X $( j ) is almost equivalent to that
of Y $( j ), when x # L, since the simulated ;j$ does not restrict the coin flips of
simulated V $, when x # L (Claim 14). We will then show that the complexity of
dummy message, :$ (i )j , is sufficiently averaged (Claim 15). (Note that Claim 14
essentially depends on x # L, but Claim 15 does not depend on whether x # L
or not.)
By combining these results, it will be shown that there are sufficiently many
solutions of each lower bound protocol (Eq. 16).
Claim 14. Let x # L. Let X $( j) and Y $( j ) be randomly selected by S$. When
x # L, for j=1, ..., k,
2Nver(X $( j ))2Nver(Y $( j ))&=(n)+log(1&=(n)).
Proof. We will prove that, if x # L, the simulated ;i$ (difference between X $( j )
and Y $( j )) affects only a negligible portion of acceptable coin flips of simulated V $ on
average, by using the properties of completeness and statistical zero-knowledgeness of
(P$, V $).
Let R$ be the set of all possible coin flips of (real) V $ and R$ (2)0 =R$.
For (:$1 , ;$1 , ..., ;$k),
R$ (1)i =[r$ # R$
(2)
i&1 | V $(x, r$, ;$1 , ..., ; i$)  (:$1 , ..., :i$)]
R$ (2)i =[r$ # R$
(1)
i | _(;$i+1 , ..., ;$k)[V $(x, r$, ;$1 , ..., ;i$ , ;$i+1 , ..., ;$k) accepts.]].
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(When i=k,
R$ (2)k =[r$ # R$
(1)
k | V $(x, r$, ;$1 , ..., ;$k) accepts.]].)
(Note that R$ (1)i is independent of ; i$ .)
Ri$=*R$ (2)i *R$
(1)
i .
Note that Ri$ is defined on the coin flips of ‘‘real’’ V $, and if a conversation,
(:$1 , ;$1 , ..., ;$k), which is either real or simulated, is given, then Ri$ (i=0, ..., k) is
fixed.
When x # L, Pr[(P, V )(x) accepts]1&12n. So
Pr[(P$, V $)(x) accepts](1&12n)k9d 9>1&=(n).
Therefore, if x # L, for a real conversation, (:$1 , ;$1 , ..., ;$k), generated by P$ and V $,
R$1 } R$2 } } } R$k>1&=(n),
with probability (taken over the coin flips of (P$, V $)) greater than 1&=(n), since,
for a fixed (deterministic) prover, P$,
ER$[R$1 } R$2 } } } R$k]=Pr[(P$, V $)(x) accepts].
Hence, for a simulated conversation, (:$1 , ;$1 , ..., ;$k), randomly selected by S$,
R$1 } R$2 } } } R$k>1&=(n),
with probability greater than 1&=(n), since (P$, V $) is statistical zero-knowledge.
(The probability is taken over the coin flips of S$.) Then, for any i=1, ..., k,
Ri$>1&=(n),
with probability greater than 1&=(n). Thus,
2Nver(X $( j ))2Nver(Y $( j ))&=(n)(1&=(n))=2Nver(Y $( j ))&=(n)+log(1&=(n)),
since if f (n)<d $ } =(n), then f (n)<=(n). K
Claim 15. Let X $(i )( j&1) be selected randomly according to the distribution of
S$. Then, with probability greater than 1&=(n),
*[:$ (i )j | Nver(X $
(i )( j&1), :$ (i )j )Nver(Y $( j ))&k
5d 6]
2Nver(X $( j&1))&Nver(Y $( j ))&2k
5d6,
where log(1&=(n)) is neglected.
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Proof. First we will explain the outline of the proof. Given X $(i )( j&1), let :$ (i )j
be called ‘‘:-bad’’ if |Nver(X $(i )( j&1), :$ (i )j )&Nver(Y $( j ))|k
5d 6.
When X $(i )( j&1) is given, we consider how much portion of possible :$ (i )j ’s are
:-bad.
Let X $(i )( j&1) be called ‘‘X-bad’’ if at least 2&kd portion of possible :$ (i )j ’s are
:-bad.
If at least 2&kd portion of X $(i )( j&1) are X-bad (i.e., the probability that X-bad
X $(i )( j&1) is selected by S$ is greater than 2&kd), the implication is that, in total,
2&kd24 &kd=2&2kd portion of Y $( j )) is |Nver(Y $( j ))&Nver(Y $( j ))|k5d 6 (i.e.,
Pr[ |Nver(Y $( j ))&Nver(Y $( j ))|k5d 6]>2&2kd>e&2kd). This contradicts Eq. (14).
Therefore, the probability that X-bad X $(i )( j&1) is selected by S$ is less than or
equal to 2&kd (Eq. (15)). In other words, X-good (not X-bad) X $(i )( j&1) is selected
by S$ with probability greater than 1&2&kd.
Using this result, we can prove this claim easily.
We will show the above-mentioned description more formally.
The Hoeffding inequality is also used to analyze the probability. Since
0Nver(X( j&1)) g, if w$ (i )(X ), j is randomly selected, then
Pr[|Nver(X $(i )( j&1))&Nver(X $( j&1))|k5d 6]e&2kd
2g<e&2kd, (13)
where
S$(x, w$ (i)(X ), j)  (X $
(i )( j&1), V ).
Similarly, if w$ (i )(X ), j is randomly selected, then
Pr[|Nver(X $(i )( j&1), :$ (i )j )&Nver(Y $( j ))|k
5d 6]e&2kd, (14)
where
S$(x, w$ (i )(X ), j)  (X $
(i )( j&1), :$ (i )j , V ).
Hence, for X $(i )( j&1) randomly selected by S$,
Pr _ :
:j
$(i ) | |Nver(X $
(i )( j&1), :j
$(i ) )&Nver(Y $( j ))| k
5d6
2Nsim(X $
(i )( j&1), :j
$(i ) )2&kd } 2Nsim(X $
(i )( j&1))&
(=Pr[X $(i )( j&1) is X-bad])
= :
X $(i )( j&1)
Pr _X $(i )( j&1) is output by S$ such that
:
:j
$(i ) | |Nver(X $
(i )( j&1), :j
$(i )&Nver(Y $( j ))|k
5d6
2Nsim(X $
(i )( j&1), :j
$(i ) )2&kd } 2Nsim(X $
(i )( j&1))&
\=\ :X $(i )( j&1) : X-bad 2
Nsim(X $
(i )( j&1))+<2d $+
2&kd, (15)
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since if X $(i )( j&1): X&bad 2
Nsim(X $
(i )( j&1))>2&kd } 2d $, then ((X $(i )( j&1), :j$(i ) ): :&bad
2Nsim(X $
(i )( j&1), :j
$(i ) ))>2&kd } 2&kd } 2d $>e&2kd } 2d $, and this contracts Eq. (14).
Thus, if X $(i )( j&1) is randomly selected by S$,
:
:j
$(i ) | Nver(Y $( j ))+k
5d6>Nver(X $
(i )( j&1), :j
$(i ))>Nver(Y $( j ))&k
5d6
2Nsim(X $
(i )( j&1), :j
$(i ))
>(1&2&kd) } 2Nsim(X $
(i )( j&1)),
with probability greater than (1&2&kd)>1&=(n) (the probability is taken over the
coin flips of S$). Moreover, since (P$, V$) is statistical zero-knowledge,
:
:j
$(i ) | Nver(Y $( j ))+k
5d 6>Nver(X $
(i )( j&1), :j
$(i ))>Nver(Y $( j ))&k
5d 6
2Nver(X $
(i )( j&1), :j
$(i ))
>(1&=(n)) } 2Nver(X $(i )( j&1)),
with probability greater than 1&=(n).
Therefore, with probability greater than 1&=(n),
*[:$ (i)j | Nver(Y $( j ))+k5d 6>Nver(X $(i )( j&1), :$ (i )j )>Nver(Y $( j ))&k5d 6]
2Nver(X $
(i )( j&1))+log(1&=(n))2Nver(Y $( j ))+k5d6
2Nver(X $( j&1))&Nver(Y $( j ))&2k
5d6,
since Nver(X $(i )( j&1))>Nver(X $( j&1))&k5d 6 and Nver(X $(i )( j&1), :$ (i )j )<
Nver(Y $( j ))+k5d 6, where log(1&=(n)) is neglected. K
Using Claims 14 and 15,
*[:$ (i )j | Nver(X $
(i )( j&1), :$ (i )j )Nver(Y $( j ))&k
5d 6]
2Nver(Y $( j&1))&Nver(Y $( j ))&2k
5d6,
where =(n)&log(1&=(n)) is neglected. Therefore,
‘
i&1
j=1
*[:$ (i )j | Nver(X $
(i)( j&1), :$ (i )j )Nver(Y $( j ))&k
5d 6]
2j=1
i&1 (Nver(Y $( j&1))&Nver(Y $( j ))&2k
5d6)
=2Nver(Y $(0))&Nver(Y $(i&1))&(i&1) 2k
5d 6)
=2 g$&Nver(Y $(i&1))&(i&1) 2k
5d 6),
with probability greater than 1&=(n). (Note that if f (n)>(1&=(n))i&1, then
f (n)>1&=(n).)
75STATISTICAL ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOFS
Similarly, if (:~ $1 , ; $1 , ..., ; $i&1) is randomly selected,
*[:~ i$ | Nver(:~ $1 , ; $1 , ..., :~ i$)Nver(Y $(i ))&k5d 6]
2Nver(Y $(i&1))&Nver(Y $(i ))&2k
5d6,
with probability greater than 1&=(n).
Hence,
‘
i&1
j=1
*[:$ (i )j | Nver(X $
(i )( j&1), :$ (i )j )Nver(Y $( j ))&k
5d 6]
} *[:~ $1 , ; $1 , ..., :~ i$)Nver(Y $(i ))&k5d 6]
2 g$&Nver(Y $(i ))&i2k
5d 6,
with probability greater than 1&=(n).
Similarly, if Y $(i ) is randomly selected,
Nver(Y $(i))Nver(Y $(i ))&k5d 6,
with probability greater than (1&e&2kd).
Thus,
‘
i&1
j=1
*[:$ (i )j | Nver(X $
(i )( j&1), :$ (i )j )Nver(Y $( j ))&k
5d 6]
} *[:~ i$ | Nver(:~ $1 , ; $1 , ..., :~ i$)Nver(Y $(i ))&k5d 6] } *[r$(i )]
2 g$&(i+1) 2k
5d6, (16)
with probability greater than 1&=(n), under the condition that (:~ $1 , ; $1 , ..., ; $i&1) is
(statistically) randomly selected. Accordingly, (:$ (i )1 , :$
(i)
2 , ..., :$
(i )
i&1 , :~ i$ , r$
(i )) which
satisfies the equations of Main-test of Part II exists with probability greater than
(1&2&15(i+1) k
5d 6)(1&=(n)).
The above evaluation assumed that (:~ $1 , ; $1 , ..., ; $i&1) is (statistically) randomly
selected. We now prove this by using induction. Here note that if both Di and Di+1
are statistically close to the same distribution, D0 , then Di is statistically close to
Di+1 . (This is trivial from the definition of the statistical closeness.) First, when
i=1, we can show that :~ $1 is selected (statistically) randomly, using an evaluation
essentially the same as Lemma 12. If (:~ $1 , ; $1 , ..., ; $j&1) is (statistically) randomly
selected, then from the evaluation essentially the same as Lemma 12, :~ j$ is (statistically)
randomly selected. ; j$ is also randomly selected by M based on the distribution
of S$. Therefore, (:~ j$ , ; j$) is (statistically) randomly selected.
Finally, we will prove that (:$ (i )1 , :$
(i )
2 , ..., :$
(i )
i&1 , :~ i$ , r$
(i )) selected in Main-test of
Part II passes Posttest of Part II with probability greater than (1&=(n)). The
probability is taken over the coin-flips of M and A.
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As mentioned above, :$ (i )j selected in Main-test of Part II satisfies the following
condition,
Nver(X $(i )( j&1), :$ (i )j )Nver(Y $( j ))&k
5d 6,
with probability greater than (1&=(n)). Since (P$, V$) is statistical zero-knowledge,
2Nsim(Y $( j ))&Nver(Y $( j))2d $& g$&log(1&=(n)),
2Nsim(Y $( j))2Nver(Y $( j )) } 2d $& g$&log(1&=(n)).
Hence,
Nsim(X $(i )( j&1), :$ (i )j )Nsim(Y $( j ))&k
5d 6,
with probability greater than (1&=(n)), where log(1&=(n)) is neglected.
Accordingly, the Posttest of Part II is passed with probability greater than
(1&=(n)), by using a similar evaluation to that used in Part I.
3.5. Proof of Soundness
We assume that x  L. We will now show that, for any M*, (M*, A)(x) accepts
with negligible probability.
First, we will prove that all of X $(i )( j ) (i=3, ..., k+1; j=1, ..., i&2) and Y $(i )(i )
(i=1, ..., k), which are the output of Part I in (M*, A) protocol, satisfy a certain
condition (X $-good and Y $-good) against any M*, with overwhelming probability.
We will then show that, if x  L, any M* can make A accept the Part II protocol
with negligible probability, assuming that X $(i )( j )’s and Y $(i )(i )’s satisfy the
condition (X $-good and Y $-good).
Note that any claim in this proof does not depend on either x # L or x  L. The
fact that x  L will be used only in the final stage of this proof, just after Claim 22.
Part I
First, we will show that all of X $(i )( j ) (i=3, ..., k+1; j=1, ..., i&2) and Y $(i )(i )
(i=1, ..., k), which are selected in Part I of (M*, A) protocol for any M* (unless
M*’s messages are rejected by A), satisfy the following condition with overwhelming
probability.
Nsim(X $ (i )( j ))<Nsim(X $( j ))+k7d 9,
Nsim(Y $ (i )(i ))<Nsim(Y $(i ))+k7d 9.
Here, we say that X $I ( j ) (and Y $I (i )) is X $-good (and Y $-good) if
Nsim(X $I ( j))<Nsim(X $( j ))+k7d 9,
Nsim(Y $I ( j))<Nsim(Y $( j ))+k7d 9.
77STATISTICAL ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOFS
Otherwise, it is called X $-bad (and Y $-bad). Here the notations follow the Part I
protocol.
Claim 16. Let X $I ( j ) and X $I+1( j ) satisfy the equations in Part I protocol (where
H $I and z$I are randomly selected ).
If X $I ( j ) is X $-bad, then X $I+1( j ) is X $-good or
Nsim(X $I+1( j ))<Nsim(X $I ( j ))&(2k5d 7&18k5d 6)
with probability greater than 1&2&k5d6.
Proof. First, we will describe the proof informally.
In the procedure of WEIGHT-TEST, the lower bound protocol,
H $I (X $I+1( j ), w$I)=z$I ,
S$(x, w$I)  (X $I ( j ), V ),
is executed, in which whether
*[X $I+1( j )] } 2Nsim(X
$I ( j ))>2d $&17k
5d6
is checked.
If the weight of X $I ( j ) (Nsim(X $I ( j ))) deviates from the average value (i.e., X $I ( j )
is X $-bad),
*[X $I+1( j ) | Nsim(X $I+1( j ))Nsim(X $I ( j ))] } 2Nsim(X
$I ( j ))<2d $&2k
5d7<2d $&17k
5d6,
since
Pr[|Nsim(X $I ( j ))&Nsim(X $I ( j ))|k7d 9]e&2k
5d 7<2&2k
5d7,
(i.e., X $&bad X $( j ) 2Nsim(X $( j ))<2d $&2k
5d 7), from the Hoeffding inequality, and
*[X $I+1( j ) | Nsim(X $I+1( j ))Nsim(X $I ( j ))] } 2Nsim(X
$I ( j ))
 :
X $I+1( j ) | Nsim(X $I+1( j ))Nsim(X $I ( j ))
2Nsim(X $I+1( j)) :
X $-bad X $
.
Therefore, if X $I ( j ) is X $-bad, then Nsim(X $I+1( j )) should be smaller than
Nsim(X $I ( j )) be a certain value (T ), in order to pass the lower bound protocol.
By repeating this procedure for I=0 through k4d 3, Nsim(X $k4d 3( j )) should be
small enough.
We now give the proof more precisely.
If X $I ( j ) is randomly selected, then from the Hoeffding inequality,
Pr[|Nsim(X $I ( j ))&Nsim(X $I ( j ))|k7d 9]e&2k
5d 7<2&2k
5d7.
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Since X $I ( j ) is assumed to be X $-bad, if X $I+1( j ) is X $-bad, then both X $I ( j ) and
X $I+1( j ) are X $-bad and they satisfy the equations (the lower bound protocol) in
Part I protocol. Then, for T>0,
*[X $I+1( j ) | Nsim(X $I+1( j ))Nsim(X $I ( j ))&T] } 2Nsim(X
$I ( j ))&T<2d $&2k
5d7.
Now let T=2k5d 7&18k5d 6. Then,
*[X $I+1( j ) | Nsim(X $I+1( j ))Nsim(X $I ( j ))&T] } 2Nsim(X
$I ( j ))
=*[X $I+1( j ) | Nsim(X $I+1( j ))Nsim(X $I ( j ))&T] } 2Nsim(X
$I ( j))&T } 2T
<2d $&2k
5d 7 } 2T
=2d $&17k
5d 6 } 2&k
5d6,
and remember that (d $&17k5d 6) is the bit size of z$I .
So, when H $I , z$I are selected randomly, from the lemma of the lower bound
protocol, the probability that X $I+1(J ) is X $-bad and that Nsim(X $I+1( j ))>
Nsim(X $I (J ))&T is less than 2&k
5d6. K
Using Claim 16, we will show that at least one of X $I ( j ) (I=0, ..., k4d 3) becomes
X $-good.
Claim 17. If all of X $I ( j ) (I=0, ..., k4d 3) satisfy the equations in Part I protocol,
at least one of X $I ( j ) (I=0, ..., k4d 3) must be X $-good with overwhelming probability.
Proof. Since
d $&(k4d 3) T=d $&(2k9d 10&18k9d 9)=&k9d 10+18k9d 9<0,
if this procedure is repeated k4d 3 times and all X $I ( j) (I=0, ..., k4d 3) are X $-bad,
then Nsim(X $k4d3( j )) must be less than 0 with probability greater than (1&2&k
5d6)k
4d3>
1&=(n). This contradicts the assumption that, for all I=0, ..., k4d 3, Nsim(X $I ( j ))
must be greater than Nsim(X $( j ))+k7d 9. Thus, at least one of X $I ( j ) (I=0, ..., k4d 3)
must be X $-good with overwhelming probability. K
Next we will show that if X $I ( j ) becomes X $-good once, then it is very hard for
X $I+1( j ) to switch (back) to X $-bad.
Claim 18. Let X $I ( j ) and X $I+1( j ) satisfy the equations in Part I protocol (where
H $I and z$I are randomly selected ).
If X $I ( j ) is X $-good, then X $I+1( j) is X $-bad with probability less then
2&2k
5d7+17k5d 6.
Proof. If X $I ( j ) is X $-good and X $I+1( j ) is X $-bad,
Nsim(X $I ( j ))<Nsim(X $I+1( j )).
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Hence,
*[X $I+1( j )] } 2Nsim(X
$I ( j ))<*[X $I+1( j )] } 2Nsim(X
$I+1( j ))
<2d $&2k
5d 7=2d $&17k
5d 6 } 2&2k
5d7+17k5d 6,
since when X $I+1( j ) is X $-bad,
*[X $I+1( j )] } 2Nsim(X
$I+1( j ))<2d $&2k
5d7. K
Thus, from Claims 17 and 18, X $k4d3( j ) (i.e., X $(i )( j )) is X $-good with overwhelm-
ing probability. Similarly, Y $k4d 3(i ) (i.e., Y $(i )(i )) is Y $-good with overwhelming
probability.
Part II
Now we will prove that if x  L, then any M* can make A accept the Part II
protocol with negligible probability, assuming that all of X $(i )( j ) (i=3, ..., k+1;
j=1, ..., i&2), and Y $(i ) (i=1, ..., k) are X $-good and Y $-good, respectively. This
implies that if x  L, then any M* can make A accept ‘‘the whole protocol’’ with
negligible probability, since the outputs of Part I are good (X $-good and Y $-good)
with overwhelming probability.
Here, we consider (P$, V$) to characterize the property of (P, V ). When x  L,
then for any P*, Pr[(P*, V )(x) accepts]12n. Then, for any P$*,
Pr[(P$*, V$)(x) accepts]12k9d 9n.
First, a brief explanation of the proof of soundness regarding Part II will be
given. Here we assume that the outputs of Part I are all good, i.e., all of X $(i )( j )
(i=3, ..., k+1; j=1, ..., i&2) and Y $(i ) (i=1, ..., k) are X $-good and Y $-good,
respectively.
In Part II, if the complexity of dummy message :$ (i )j is much bigger than the
average value, then M* has a chance to cheat A, since the reserved size for :~ i$ in
the hashing protocol can be very small (i.e., even if there exists no cheating prover,
P$*, such that (P$*, V$) is accepted, a cheating prover, M*, can be constructed).
Therefore, the technical key point in the proof (soundness) of Part II is how to
guarantee that the complexity of :$ (i )j is not much larger than the average value.
The complexity of :$ (i )j is at most (a&b), where a is the maximum w-weight of
(X $(i )( j&1)) and b is the minimum w-weight of (X $(i )( j&1), :$ (i )j ). Hence, in order
to bound the complexity of :$ (i )j , we have to restrict the messages such that the
w-weight of (X $(i)( j&1)) is not much larger than the average value and that the
w-weight of (X $(i )( j&1), :$ (i )j ) is not much smaller than the average value. Here, we
can assume that the w-weight of (X $(i )( j&1)) is not much larger than the average
value, since X $(i )( j ) is assumed to be X $-good. Therefore, the remaining problem in
Part II is to guarantee that the w-weight of (X $(i )( j&1), :$ (i )j ) is not much smaller
than the average value.
The posttest in Part II is introduced for this purpose. That is, the posttest
guarantees that the w-weight of (X $(i )( j&1), :$ (i )j ) is not much smaller than the
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average value (Claim 19) and that the complexity of :$ (i )j is not much larger than
the average value (Claim 20).
Similarly it is also obtained that the complexity of r$(i ) is not much larger than
the average value (Claim 20).
Based on these results, Claim 22 shows that the reserved complexity for
(:~ $1 , ..., :~ $k , r~ $) should be greater than the required value, when (M*, A) accepts with
probability greater than 2&n. Here, a technical claim, Claim 21, is required to
bridge the w-weight (regarding simulator’s randomness w$), Nsim-value, and the
r-weight (regarding verifier’s randomness r$), Nver -value, since the complexities of
dummy messages are restricted by WEIGHT-TEST (PretestPosttest) based on
Nsim -value, while the complexities of (:~ $1 , ..., :~ $k , r~ $) should be evaluated by the
Nver -values.
This leads to the fact that if (M*, A) accepts with probability greater than 2&n,
then there exists prover P$* such that (P$*, V$) accepts with probability bigger than
the requirement of soundness, 12k9d9n. Thus, we can conclude that (M*, A) accepts
with probability less than 2&n.
Since the outputs of Part I are all good, with overwhelming probability, in total
(combining with Part I), we show that, for any M*, A accepts the protocol with
negligible probability.
Claim 19. If :$ (i )j (i=2, ..., k+1; j=1, ..., i&1) and r$
(i ) (i=1, ..., k) pass the
Posttest in Part II, then :$ (i )j and r$
(i ) satisfy
Nsim(X $ (i )( j&1), :$ (i )j )>Nsim(Y $( j ))&k
7d 9,
Nsim((Y $ (i )(i ), V ; r$(i ))>Nsim(Y $(i ), r$)&k7d 9
with overwhelming probability. Here,
Nsim(Y $(i ), r$)=log *[w$ | S$(x, w$)  (Y $(i ), V ; r$)],
and Nsim(Y $(i ), r$) are the expected value of Nsim(Y $(i ), r$) over the coin flips of S$.
Proof. We will prove this claim in a manner similar to the proof of Claims 16
and 17.
First, we assume that
Nsim(X $(i )( j&1), :$ (i )j )Nsim(Y $( j ))&k
7d 9.
(Here, Y0( j)=X $(i )( j&1), :$ (i )j .)
If Y $J ( j ) is randomly selected, then from the Hoeffding inequality,
Pr[|Nsim(Y $J ( j ))&Nsim(Y $J ( j ))|k7d 9&18k5d 6]
<e&2k5d7+72k3d 4&182kd<2&2k5d 7+72k3d4.
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This means that
:
Y $J ( j ) s.t. |Nsim(Y $J ( j))&Nsim(Y $J ( j ))| k
7d9&18k5d6
2Nsim(Y $J ( j ))<2d $&2k
5d7+72k3d 4
=2(d $&17k
5d 6)&(32) k5d7&(k5d72&72k3d4)<2(d $&17k
5d6)&(32) k5d 7.
Assume that
Nsim(Y $J ( j))Nsim(Y $( j ))&k7d 9.
Then, to show that Nsim(Y $J+1( j )) should be less than Nsim(Y $J ( j )), we also assume
that Nsim(Y $J+1( j ))Nsim(Y $J( j )).
If
Nsim(Y $( j ))&k7d 9+18k5d 6Nsim(Y $J+1( j ))Nsim(Y $J ( j )),
then
*[Y $J+1( j )] } 2Nsim(Y
$J ( j ))< :
Y $J+1( j )
2Nsim(Y $J+1( j ))<2(d $&17k
5d6)&(32) k5d 7,
since Y $J+1( j )Nsim(Y $( j ))&k7d 9+18k5d 6.
On the other hand, if
Nsim(Y $J+1( j ))>Nsim(Y $( j ))&k7d 9+18k5d 6,
then
*[Y $J+1( j )] } 2Nsim(Y
$J ( j )$)<2d $&Nsim(Y $( j))+k
7d9&18k5d6 } 2Nsim(Y $( j ))&k
7d9
=2d $&18k
5d6
=2(d $&17k
5d6)&k5d 6.
Therefore,
*[Y $J+1( j ) | Nsim(Y $J+1( j ))Nsim(Y $J ( j ))] } 2Nsim(Y
$J ( j ))
<2(d $&17k
5d 6)&(32) k5d7+2 (d $&17k
5d6)&k5d6
=2(d $&17k
5d 6)&k5d 6(1+(32) 2&k5d6(d&1)).
Thus, to pass the WEIGHT-TEST in Part II, Y $J+1( j ) must be selected in the set
that Nsim(Y $J+1( j ))<Nsim(Y $J ( j )), with probability greater than 1&2&k
5d6(1+=(n)).
When Nsim(Y $J+1( j ))<Nsim(Y $J ( j )),
Nsim(Y $J+1( j ))<Nsim(Y $( j ))&k7d 9+18k5d 6,
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since Nsim(Y $J ( j ))<Nsim(Y $( j ))&k7d 9<Nsim(Y $( j ))&k7d 9+18k5d 6. Hence, by
using a similar evaluation described in the proof of Claim 16,
Nsim(Y $J+1( j ))<Nsim(Y $J ( j ))&((32) k5d 7&18k5d 6),
with probability greater than 1&2&k
5d6.
Since d $&(k4d 3)((32) k5d 7&18k5d 6)<0, if
Nsim(X $(i )( j&1), :$ (i )j )Nsim(Y $( j ))&k
7d 9,
then this procedure should fail with overwhelming probability (greater than
((1&2&k
5d6(1+=(n)))(1&2&k5d 6))k4d 3).
Thus, if the WEIGHT-TEST for Y $k4d3+1( j ) is passed, then
Nsim(X $(i )( j&1), :$ (i )j )>Nsim(Y $( j ))&k
7d 9,
with overwhelming probability.
Similarly, if the WEIGHT-TEST for Z$k4d 3 is passed, then
Nsim(Y $(i )(i ), r$(i ))>Nsim(Y $(i ), r$)&k7d 9,
with overwhelming probability. K
Claim 20. Let all of X $(i)( j) (i=3, ..., k+1; j=1, ..., i&2) and Y $(i)(i) (i=1, ..., k)
be X $-good and Y $-good, respectively. In addition, let :$ (i )j (i=2, ..., k+1;
j=1, ..., i&1) and r$(i ) (i=1, ..., k) satisfy
Nsim(X $ (i )( j&1), :$ (i )j )>Nsim(Y $( j ))&k
7d 9,
Nsim((Y $(i )(i ), V ; r$(i ))>Nsim(Y $(i), r$)&k7d 9.
Then
*[:$ (i )j ]2Nsim(X $( j&1))&Nsim(Y $( j ))+2k
7d9,
*[r$(i )]2Nsim(Y $(i ))&Nsim(Y $(i ), r$)+2k7d9.
(Here, X $(0) is a null string.)
Proof. For X $(i )( j ),
Nsim(X $(i)( j&1))<Nsim(X $( j&1))+k7d 9.
Therefore,
*[:$ (i )j ]2
Nsim(X $
(i)( j&1))2Nsim(Y $( j ))&k7d9
2Nsim(X $( j&1))+k
7d92Nsim(Y $( j ))&k7d9
=2Nsim(X $( j&1))&Nsim(Y $( j ))+2k
7d9.
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Similarly,
*[r$(i )]2Nsim(Y$(i ))&Nsim(Y $(i ), r$)+2k7d 9. K
As shown in Claim 20, the property that the complexity of :$ (i )j is restricted to be
not much larger than the average value is characterized by the Nsim-value (not
Nver -value) (in other words, by the w-weight w.r.t. w$, not by the r-weight w.r.t. r$.)
On the other hand, in the random hashing protocols (the lower bound protocols)
in Main-test of Part II, the complexity and r-weight (i.e., Nver-values) are used.
Therefore, we need to evaluate the relationship between Nsim -value and Nver-value.
Claim 21 shows this relationships.
Claim 21. For all j=0, ..., k,
|(Nsim(X $( j&1))&Nsim(Y $( j )))&(Nver(X $( j&1))&Nver(Y $( j )))|<4k5d 6,
|(Nsim(Y $( j ))&Nsim(Y $( j ), r$))&Nver(Y $( j ))|<2k5d 6.
Proof. In this proof, Nsim-value and Nver-value are linked through Nsim(X $( j), r$)
and Nsim(Y $( j ), r$). By the Hoeffding inequality,
|Nsim(X $( j ))&Nsim(X $( j ))|<k5d 6,
|Nver(X $( j))&Nver(X $( j ))|<k5d 6,
with probability greater than (1&e&2kd)2. Hence,
|Nsim(X $( j ), r$)&(Nsim(X $( j ))&Nver(X $( j )))|<2k5d 6,
with probability greater than (1&e&2kd)2. This is because: the maximum w-weight
of X $( j ) w.r.t. w$ is Nsim(X $( j ))+k5d 6, and the minimum r-weight of X $( j ) w.r.t. r$
is Nver(X $( j))&k5d 6, with probability greater than (1&e&2kd)2 (over the random
selection of X $( j ) by S$). Then, the w-weight of r$ w.r.t. w$ (Nsim(X $( j ), r$)) is at
most (Nsim(X $( j ))&Nver(X $( j ))+2k5d 6), with probability greater than (1&e&2kd)2.
Similarly, it is at least (Nsim(X $( j ))&Nver(X $( j ))&2k5d 6).
Therefore,
|Nsim(X $( j ), r$)&(Nsim(X $( j ))&Nver(X $( j )))|<2k5d 6,
since d $(1&(1&e&2kd)2)<=(n) (i.e., a negligible fraction of X $( j ) negligibly affects
the average value). Similarly,
|Nsim(Y $( j ), r$)&(Nsim(Y $( j ))&Nver(Y $( j )))|<2k5d 6.
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Hence,
|(Nsim(Y $( j ))&Nsim(Y $( j ), r$))&Nver(Y $( j ))|<2k5d 6.
On the other hand,
Nsim(X $( j&1), r$)=Nsim(Y $( j ), r$),
since for r$, X $( j&1)=(:$1 , ;$1 , ..., ;$j&1) is the prefix of Y $( j )=(:$1 , ;$1 , ..., ;$j&1 , :j$),
and :j$ (i.e., Y $( j )) is uniquely determined from r$ and X $( j&1). Therefore,
Nsim(X $( j&1), r$)=Nsim(Y $( j ), r$).
Thus
|(Nsim(X $( j&1))&Nsim(Y $( j )))&(Nver(X $( j&1))&Nver(Y $( j )))|
<|Nsim(X $( j&1), r$)&Nsim(Y $( j ), r$)|+4k5d 6
=4k5d 6. K
Now we assume a prover, M *, which passes Main-test of Part II with with
probability greater than 12n.
Claim 22. Let all of X $(i)( j) (i=3, ..., k+1; j=1, ..., i&2) and Y $(i)(i) (i=1, ..., k)
be X $-good and Y $-good, respectively. In addition, let :$ (i )j (i=2, ..., k+1;
j=1, ..., i&1) and r$(i ) (i=1, ..., k) satisfy
Nsim(X $ (i )( j&1), :$ (i )j )>Nsim(Y $( j ))&k
7d 9,
Nsim((Y $(i )(i ), V ; r$(i ))>Nsim(Y $(i), r$)&k7d 9.
If, for i=1, ..., (k+1), a prover, M *, passes Main-test of Part II protocol with
probability greater than 12n, then
:
k
i=1
log *[:~ i$]+log *[r~ $]> g$&3k9d 9.
Proof. This proof can be obtained in a fairly straightforward manner from
Claims 20 and 21. That is, the required total complexity of :~ i$ (i=1, ..., k) and r~ $ can
be calculated by subtracting the total complexity of dummy messages, :$ (i )j and
r$(i&1), from around (k+1) g$.
We now prove this formally.
Nsim(X $( j&1))&Nsim(Y $( j )))<Nver(X $( j&1))&Nver(Y $( j )))+4k5d 6,
from Claim 21.
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Therefore,
:
i&1
j=1
(Nsim(X $( j&1))&Nsim(Y $( j )))
< :
i&1
j=1
(Nver(X $( j&1))&Nver(Y $( j )))+4(i&1) k5d 6
 :
i&1
j=1
(Nver(Y $( j&1))&Nver(Y $( j )))+4ik5d 6
=(Nver(Y $(0))&Nver(Y $(i&1)))+4(i&1) k5d 6.
Here note that Nver(X $( j&1))Nver(Y $( j&1)) and that Y $(0) is a null string.
Hence,
‘
i&1
j=1
*[:$ (i)j ]<2Nver(Y $(0))&Nver(Y $(i&1)))+4(i&1) k
5d 6+(i&1) 2k7d9.
Similarly, from Claims 20 and 21,
*[r$(i )]2Nver(Y $(i ))+2k7d9+2k5d6.
Therefore,
‘
i&1
j=1
*[:$ (i )j ] } *[r$ (i&1)]<2Nver(Y $(0))+i(2k
7d9+4k5d 6)+2k5d 6
<2 g$+i(2k
7d9+4k5d 6)+2k5d6,
since Nver(Y $(0)) g$. So,
:
i&1
j=1
log *[:$ (i )j ]+log *[r$
(i&1)]< g$+i(2k7d 9+4k5d 6)+2k5d 6.
On the other hand, to pass the check in Part II 1(b) protocol with probability
greater than 12n (from the property of the lower bound protocol),
log *[:~ i$]> g$&17(k+1) k5d 6&n&\ :
i&1
j=1
log *[:$ (i )j ]+log *[r$(i )]+ .
(For i=1, the term,  i&1j=1 log *[:$
(i )
j ], should be neglected.)
log *[r~ $]> g$&17(k+1) k5d 6&n&\ :
k
j=1
log *[:$ (k+1)j ]+ .
86 TATSUAKI OKAMOTO
So, in total,
:
k
i=1
log *[:~ i$]+log *[r~ $]
>(k+1)(g$&17(k+1) k5d 6&n)& :
k+1
i=2 \ :
i&1
j=1
log *[:$ (i )j ]+& :
k
i=1
log *[r$(i )]
=(k+1)(g$&17(k+1) k5d 6&n)& :
k+1
i=2 \ :
i&1
j=1
log *[:$ (i )j ]++log *[r$(i&1)])
>(k+1)(g$&17(k+1) k5d 6&n)&k(g$+k(2k7d 9+4k5d 6)+2k5d 6)
= g$&2k9d 9&O(k7d 6)> g$&3k9d 9. K
According to Claim 22, if there exists a prover, M *, which passes Main-test of
Part II with probability greater than 12n, then simulator S$ produces almost all
values of (:~ $1 , ..., :~ $k , r~ $) among the 2 g$ possible values such that
*[(:~ $1 , ..., :~ $k , r~ $)]>2 g$&3k
9d9,
S$(x, w~ $)  (:~ $1 , ; $1 , ..., :~ $k , ; $k ; r~ $).
Using this simulator, S$, we can construct a prover, P $*, of (zero-knowledge)
interactive proof (P$, V$) with success probability greater than 123k9d9>12k9d 9n.
That is, P $* sends ; i$ to V$ after receiving :~ i$ from V$ with the same distribution
of S$. In other words, after receiving :~ i$ from V$, P $* randomly selects w~ $ under the
restriction of S$(x, w~ $)  (:~ $1 , ; $1 , ..., :~ i$ , V ) and calculates and sends ; i$ to V$.
Since w~ $, with which S$ outputs (:~ $1 , ..., :~ $k , r~ $), implies P $*’s success strategy
against the coin flips of V$, (:~ $1 , ..., :~ $k , r~ $),
Pr[(P $*, V$)(x) accepts]>2 g$&3k9d 92 g$
=123k9d9
>12k9d9n.
(Note that g$=k9d 9g.)
This contradicts x  L. Therefore, no prover, M *, passes Main-test of Part II with
probability greater than 12n; i.e., Main-test of Part II protocol is passed with prob-
ability at most 12n, under the condition (say, Dummy message condition) that all
of X $(i )( j ) (i=3, ..., k+1; j=1, ..., i&2) and Y $(i )(i ) (i=1, ..., k) are X $-good and
Y $-good, respectively, and :$ (i )j (i=2, ..., k+1; j=1, ..., i&1) and r$
(i ) (i=1, ..., k)
satisfy
Nsim(X $ (i )( j&1), :$ (i )j )>Nsim(Y $( j ))&k
7d 9,
Nsim((Y $(i )(i ), V ; r$(i ))>Nsim(Y $(i), r$)&k7d 9.
When the total protocol of (M*, A) is accepted (i.e., Pretest (Part I), Main-test
(Part II), and Posttest (Part II) are all passed), there are two cases:
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1. Dummy message condition holds with probability greater than 1&=(n)
(from Claims 1719), and Main-test (Part II) is passed with probability less than
12n (mentioned above). Hence, the total probability of this case is less than 12n.
2. Pretest (Part I) and Posttest (Part II) give at least one ‘‘bad’’ dummy
message with probability less than =(n) (from Claims 1719), and Main-test
(Part II) is passed with unknown probability (at most 1). Hence, the total probability
of this case is less than =(n).
Thus, the total protocol of (M, A) is accepted with probability less than =(n)
(<12n+=(n)).
3.6. Proof of Zero-knowledgeness
When x # L, for an honest verifier A, a simulator S for (M, A) can be constructed
as follows:
First, we describe two subroutines of S : SIMU-PRE regarding WEIGHT-TEST
(Pretest) and SIMU-POST regarding WEIGHT-TEST (Posttest).
[SIMU-PRE]
Parameters: (S, XI , K, m, d, $)
Output: (XK0 , wK0), ..., (XK0+K , wK0+K); (HK0 , zK0), ..., (HK0+K&1 , zK0+K&1)
1. S randomly selects coin flips for simulator S, wI (I=K0 , ..., K0+K).
2. S calculates XI :
S(x, wI)  (XI , V ) (I=K0 , ..., K0+K)
3. S randomly selects (m+d+1)_(d&$) matrix, H $I (I=K0 , ..., K0+K&1).
4. S calculates zI , such that
zI=HI (XI+1 , wI) (I=K0 , ..., K0+K&1).
[End of SIMU-PRE]
[SIMU-POST]
Parameters: (S, XI , K, m, d, $)
Input: (XK0 , wK0)
Output: (XK0+1 , wK0+1), ..., (XK0+K , wK0+K); (HK0 , zK0), ..., (HK0+K&1 , zK0+K&1)
This procedure is the same as that of SIMU-PRE except the input: in SIMU-
POST, (XK0 , wK0) is given as input, while, in SIMU-PRE, (XK0 , wK0) is generated.
[End of SIMU-POST]
[SIMULATOR: S ]
1. Repeat the following protocol for i from 3 to k+1, and j from 1 to i&2.
(a) [SIMU-PRE]
Parameters: (S$, X $I ( j ), k4d 3+1, mj$ , d j$ , 17k5d 6)
Output: (X $0( j ), w$0), ..., (X $k4d 3+1( j ), wk4d3+1)$;
(H $0 , z$0), ..., (H $k4d 3 , z$k4d3)
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2. Repeat the following protocol for i from 1 to k.
(a) [SIMU-PRE]
Parameters: (S$, Y $I (i ), k4d 3+1, qj$ , d j$ , 17k5d 6)
Output: (Y $0(i ), w$0), ..., (Y $k4d3+1(i ), w$k4d3+1); (H $0 , z$0), ..., (H $k4d3 , z$k4d3)
3. (a) For i from 2 to k+1, S randomly selects coin flips for simulator S$,
w$ (i)(X ), 1 . (Note that w$
(i )
(X ), 1 corresponds to w$0 in Posttest of Part II
protocol for (i, 1).)
(b) S calculates :$ (i )j (i=2, ..., k+1; j=1, ..., i&2) and r$
(i ) (i=1, ..., k) as
follows:
S$(x, w$ (i )(X ), j+1)  (:$
(i )
j+1 , V ),
S$(x, w$ (i )(Y ))  (Y $(i ), V ; r$
(i )).
4. Repeat the following protocol for i from 1 to k+1, and j from 1 to i&1.
[SIMU-POST]
Parameters: (S$, Y $I # [Y $( j )], k4d 3+1, l j$ , d $, 17k5d 6)
Input: Y $0=(X $(i )( j&1), :$ (i )j )
(Note: X $(i )(0) means a null string.)
Output: (Y $1 , w$1), ..., (Y $k4d3 , w$k4d3); (H $0 , z$0), ..., (H $k4d3 , z$k4d3)
[SIMU-POST]
Parameters: (S$, Z$I # [(Y $( j ), r$)], k4d 3+1, q j$+ g$, d $, 17k5d 6)
Input: Y $0=(Y $(i )(i ), r$ (i ))
Output: (Z$1 , w$1), ..., (Z$k4d3 , w$k4d3); (H $0 , z$0), ..., (H $k4d3 , z$k4d3)
(Note: Y $I ( j ) (and Z$I ( j )) corresponds to Y $I (and Z$I) in Posttest of Part II
protocol.)
5. (a) S randomly selects coin flips for simulator S$, w~ $
S$(x, w~ $)  (:~ $1 , ; $1 , ..., :~ $k , ; $k ; r~ $),
(b) S also randomly selects (Li+ g$+1)_(g$&17k5d 6) matrix H i$ , for i
from 1 to k+1.
(c) S calculates zi$ (i=1, ..., k+1) such that
H i$ ((:$ (i )1 , :$
(i )
2 , ..., :$
(i )
i&1), :~ i$ , r$
(i ))=zi$ .
6. Finally S arranges these values in the order of (M, A) protocol and
outputs them.
[End of SIMULATOR S ]
Next we will prove that this simulation is statistically close to A’s view (A’s coin
flips and M’s messages).
This simulation is straightforward, since there is no backtrack and A is honest.
Therefore, to prove statistical zero-knowledgeness, it is sufficient to prove that each
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step (round) of the simulation is statistically close to the corresponding A’s view in
this case. (Trivially we can apply induction to prove this.)
Therefore, given randomly selected X $I , if one round of WEIGHT-TEST,
(H $I , z$I , X $I+1 , w$I), is statistically close to the simulation, we can prove the statistical
zero-knowledgeness of (M, A). Lemmas 11 and 12 show that this is true.
Similarly, we can show that the other simulated variables in WEIGHT-TEST are
statistically close to the corresponding real conversation. Note that to prove the
randomness of zi$ in Part II, we need an additional technique, since *[C=
(:$ (i )1 , ..., :$
(i)
i&1 , :~ i$ , r$
(i ))] is analyzed based on Nver -values (i.e., number of r$) as
described in the proof of completeness, but Pr[C | (X $(i )(1), ..., Y $(i ))] is defined on
Nsim -values (i.e., number of w$). However, this problem can be easily solved,
because the distribution of simulated r$ is statistically close to a uniform distribution
(as (P$, V$) is statistical zero-knowledge).
Finally, as mentioned in the proof of the completeness condition, if x # L,
then the success probability of (M, A) is overwhelming. So, the total simulated
conversation is statistically close to the total real conversation.
4. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
4.1. Informal Proof Sketch of Theorem 2
First, we will describe a naive transformation protocol. We will then roughly
introduce the flaw of the naive protocol and introduce a technical idea to fix the
flaw.
The naive protocol is based on the idea in [For89].
Let (M, A) be a statistical zero-knowledge public-coin proof against an honest
verifier, A, for language L. We will construct a statistical zero-knowledge proof,
(P, V ), against an honest verifier, V, for ‘‘the complement of L,’’ L .
1. Assume that (M, A) is three rounds. V runs the simulator of (M, A) three
times and gets three simulated conversations:
(: (1)1 , ;
(1)
1 , :
(1)
2 , ;
(1)
2 , :
(1)
3 , ;
(1)
3 ),
(: (2)1 , ;
(2)
1 , :
(2)
2 , ;
(2)
2 , :
(2)
3 , ;
(2)
3 ),
(: (3)1 , ;
(3)
1 , :
(3)
2 , ;
(3)
2 , :
(3)
3 , ;
(3)
3 ),
V selects a random matrix, H, and calculates
z=H(: (1)1 , :
(1)
2 , :
(1)
3 ; :
(2)
2 , :
(2)
3 ; :
(3)
3 ).
V sends prefixes, (: (2)1 , ;
(2)
1 ), and (:
(3)
1 , ;
(3)
1 , :
(3)
2 , ;
(3)
2 ), H, and z.
2. P is required to guess these suffixes,
(: (1)1 , :
(1)
2 , :
(1)
3 ; :
(2)
2 , :
(2)
3 , :
(3)
3 ).
3. V accepts, if and only if the values guessed by P are all correct.
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This naive protocol looks as if it satisfies the completeness and soundness condi-
tions as follows:
[Soundness] When x  L , the distribution of suffixes (: values) is almost
uniform, so even infinite prover P cannot guess the suffixes with greater than a
certain probability.
[Completeness] When x # L , in the simulated conversation, the values
(;1 , ;2 , ;3) in prefixes are biased by the future values (i.e., their suffixes) of A’s
messages. In other words, the values (;1 , ;2 , ;3) in the prefixes restrict the distribu-
tion of their suffixes (: values). Therefore, given the prefixes and the hashed value
of their suffixes (: values), P can guess the correct value of these suffixes with high
probability. (Here note that since (M, A) is a public-coin protocol, (;1 , ;2 , ;3)
affects only the future coin values of A, not the private (concealed) coin values
of A.)
The proof of the naive construction, especially completeness, seems to be correct,
if we prove the following: When x # L , if values (;1 , ;2 , ;3) do not restrict the
distribution of their suffixes much, then a contradiction is made by using the
simulation-based prover, M*, that makes A accept with high probability.
However, a counterexample to the proof in [For89] pointed out by [GOP94]
also implies that we cannot always make such a contradiction to the naive protocol.
That is, the naive protocol may not satisfy the completeness condition.
The essential point in this proof is that the w-weight of coin flips of A (with
respect to coin flips, w, of the simulator) is not considered in this naive construction
and in the proof of completeness based on the simulation-based prover.
In other words, if the simulator outputs simulated conversations including the
simulated coin flips (messages), :1 , :2 , and :3 , of A with a very biased distribution,
then completeness cannot be always satisfied.
We will explain this more precisely. We assume that the simulator outputs
(simulated) conversations with very biased distribution, e.g., it outputs only very
specific values of :1 and :2 . Then, even if the biased prefixes including very specific
values of :1 and :2 do not restrict the suffixes, it does not guarantee that the
simulation-based prover M* can make A accept with high probability, since only
prefixes including messages of A with a very specific distribution may not restrict
the suffixes, but prefixes including uniformly distributed messages of A may restrict
the suffixes very much. Here note that the distribution of real A’s messages is
uniform (nonbiased).
If the w-weight of the simulated conversation is around the average value, then
the distribution of the simulated messages is close to a uniform distribution.
Based on this idea of considering the w-weight of the simulated conversation, a
key technique in avoiding the flaw in the above-mentioned naive transformation
protocol is to introduce 0, a subset of coin flips, w, of a simulator. This subset
makes the simulator output the coin flips of A with approximately the average
w-weight value. (In the parallel version technique, subset 0 is the majority in the
whole set of coin flips, w, of the simulator.)
In the modified transformation protocol, P considers only conversations
simulated with coin flips in 0. This allows the counterexample case similar to that
in [GOP94] to be removed, since P ignores the simulated conversations whose
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coin flips of A are of low weight. That is, the distribution of the simulated messages
with restricted coins in 0 are relatively close to the uniform distribution. To prove
this completeness formally, we introduce a new notion, the restricted simulation-based
prover, in which the simulator’s coin flips are restricted in 0. If prefixes do not
restrict the distribution of their suffixes much, then a contradiction can be made by
using the notion of the restricted simulation-based prover, which makes A accept
with high probability.
That is, if the modified transformation protocol is not accepted when x # L , it
implies two facts: (1) the distribution of the simulated A’s messages, :1 , :2 and :3 ,
are relatively uniform, since there are many simulated A’s messages due to the
failure of the upper bound protocol and they have around average w-weight
because they are in 0; (2) the prefixes do not restrict the suffixes so much.
Hence we can construct a restricted simulation-based prover, M*, which leads to a
contradiction.
4.2. Transformation
Let (M, A) be a statistical zero-knowledge public-coin proof against an honest
verifier, A, for language L. We will then construct a statistical zero-knowledge
proof, (P, V ), against an honest verifier, V, for the complement of L, L .
We then construct a statistical zero-knowledge proof (M$, A$) from (M, A) by
running (M, A) k4nd 2 times in parallel, where d is the random tape length of
simulator S for (M, A) and g is the random tape length of A. A$ accepts if all
individual protocols are accepted. Let S$ be the simulator for (M$, A$), just parallel
execution of S for (M, A), and g$ be the random tape length of A$. Let d $ be the
random tape length of S$.
Since we dispose of the trivial cases, we can assume that the simulator, S$,
outputs a valid conversation and coin flips with overwhelming probability.
Suppose that the conversation of (M, A)(x) is (:1 , ;1 , ..., :k , ;k), where :i
(i=1, ..., k) is the ith public coin message by A and ;i is the ith message by M. Let
li be the (bit) size of :i , so g=ki=1 li . Similarly, g$=
k
i=1 l i$ . Here, :i$ and ; i$ are
the ith messages of A$ and M$, respectively, and l i$ is the (bit) size of : i$ . Let
gi$=l i$+l $i+1+ } } } +l $k , and
X $( j )=(:$1 , ;$1 , ..., :j$ , ;j$).
Note that since (M$, A$) is a public coin protocol, r$=(:$1 , :$2 , ..., :$k), where r$ is the
random tape length of A$. Here,
1. If x # L, then Pr[(M$, A$)(x) accepts](1&12n)k4nd2.
2. If x  L, then for any M $, Pr[(M $, A$)(x) accepts]12k4n2d 2.
We also define 0 as follows:
Definition of 0.
0=[w$ | S$(x, w$)  ( V ; r$) 7 |Nsim(r$)&Nsim(r$)|<k2nd 2],
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where
Nsim(r$)=log *[v$ | S$(x, v$)  ( V ; r$)],
and Nsim(r$) is the expected value of Nsim(r$) over the coin flips of S$. (Note that
P has unbounded computing power, so P can calculate Nsim(r$) and Nsim(r$), and
determine whether vi$ # 0.)
First, we show the protocol of (P, V ).
Protocol (P, V )
Common input: x
What to prove: x # L .
1. V flips coins, wi$ (i=1, ..., k), for simulator S$. V then obtains a simulated
conversation X $(i&1) such that
S$(x, wi$)  (X $(i&1), V ; ri$)
=(X $(i&1), :$ (i)i , V , :$
(i )
i+1 , V , ..., :$
(i )
k , V , ri$),
where ri$=(:$ (i)1 , :$
(i )
2 , ..., :$
(i )
k ). Here, X $(0) denotes a null string. Let
U$(i )=(:$ (i )i , :$
(i )
i+1 , ..., :$
(i )
k ).
V selects a random (G$+1)_(G$&k4n2d 2+2k4nd 2) matrix, H $, where
G$=kj=1 g j$ . V calculates
z$=H $(U$(1), U$(2), ..., U$(k)).
V sends (X $(1), X $(2), ..., X $(k&1)), H $ and z$ to P.
2. P finds (T $(1), T $(2), ..., T $(k)) such that there exist vi$ # 0 (i=1, ..., k)
satisfying the following equations,
H $(T $(1), T $(2), ..., T $(k))=z$,
S$(x, vi$ # 0)  (X $(i&1), V ; r^ i$)
=(X $(i&1), :^$ (i )i , V , :^$
(i )
i+1 , V , ..., :^$
(i )
k , V ; r^i$),
where r^i$=(:^$ (i)1 , :^$
(i )
2 , ..., :^$
(i )
k ).
T $(i )=(:^$ (i )i , :^$
(i )
i+1 , ..., :^$
(i )
k ).
When there are many candidates for (T $(1), T $(2), ..., T $(k)), one is
randomly selected. If P cannot find such (T $(1), T $(2), ..., T $(k)), P sends
‘‘give up’’ to V. Otherwise, P sends (T $(1), T $(2), ..., T $(k)) to V.
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3. V checks whether
(T $(1), T $(2), ..., T $(k))=(U$(1), U$(2), ..., U$(k)).
If this equation holds, then V accepts. otherwise, V rejects.
[End of Protocol (P, V )]
4.3. Proof of Completeness
We assume that x # L . We will now show that (P, V )(x) accepts with overwhelming
probability.
The outline of this proof is as follows. Since x  L, for any M, Pr[(M, A)(x)
accepts]12n. Hence, for a restricted simulation-based M $,
Pr[(M $, A$)(x) accepts]12k4n2d2.
We will show that *[(T $(1), T $(2), ..., T $(k))] is bounded by the value (regarding
Ri$ ) characterized by Pr[(M $, A$)(x) accepts] with high probability over the coin
flips of V$ (using Claim 23). This immediately implies (P, V )(x) accepts with high
probability.
Since 0Nver(X( j )) gd, from the Hoeffding inequality, if X $( j) is randomly
selected by S$, then
Pr[ |Nver(X $( j ))&Nver(X $( j ))|k2nd 2]
=Pr[|(Nver(X(1)( j ))+ } } } +Nver(X(k4nd 2)( j )))(k4nd 2)&Nver(X( j))|1(k2)]
e&2k4nd2(k4g2)e&2n,
where Nver(X ) is the expected value of Nver(X ) based on the distribution of X.
Moreover, from the Hoeffding inequality,
Pr[|Nsim(r$)&Nsim(r$)|<k2nd 2]>1&e&2n,
where the probability is taken over the coin flips of S$.
So, clearly,
*0>2d $(1&e&2n).
Let M $ be a restricted simulation-based prover, whose distribution is based on a
simulator in which coin flips, w$, are restricted in 0. That is, on the partial history
(:$1 , ;$1 , ..., :i$) of the conversation, M $ outputs a message ; i$ with probability
Pr[M $(:$1 , ;$1 , ..., :i$)  ; i$]
=Pr[S$(x, w$ # 0)  (:$1 , ;$1 , ..., :i$ , ; i$ , V ) | S$(x, w$ # 0)  (:$1 , ;$1 , ..., :i$ , V )].
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For the conversation of (M $, A$), X $(i)=(:$1 , ;$1 , ..., :i$ , ; i$), (i=0, ..., k&1),
R$ (1)i =[(:$1 , ..., : i$ , V ) # R$
(2)
i&1]
R$ (2)i =[(:$1 , ..., : i$ , V ) # R$
(1)
i | _(;$i+1 , ..., ;$k)[A$(x, (:$1 , ..., :i$ , V ),
(;$1 , ..., ;i$ , ;$i+1 , ..., ;$k)) accepts.]],
Ri$=*R$ (2)i *R$
(1)
i .
Here, note that
R$ (1)0 =[(:$1 , ..., :$k)],
R$ (2)0 =[r$ # R$
(1)
0 | _(;$1 , ..., ;$k)[A$(x, r$, (;$1 , ..., ;$k)) accepts.]],
*R$ (1)i =*[(:$i+1 , ..., :$k)]2 g$i.
Let Ri$ be the expected value (over the coin flips of (M $, A$)) of Ri$ . Then,
Pr[(M $, A$)(x) accepts]= ‘
k&1
i=0
R i$ .
Next, we assume that wi$ # 0 (i=1, ..., k), where wi$ is selected by V in protocol
(P, V ). Here, *[T $(i )] is determined by wi$ selected by V, and *[T $(i )] charac-
terizes the accept probability of the simulation-based protocol, where not only the
prover but also the verifier is simulation-based. In other words, *[T $(i )] charac-
terizes the accept probability of (M $, A $), where the distribution of the messages of
A $ is the same as that of simulator S$. On the other hand, Ri$ (i=0, ..., k&1) is
defined for (M $, A$) with honest A$ which generates [: i$] uniformly. In other words,
Ri$ characterizes the accept probability of (M $, A$) as shown above.
The next claim shows that *[T $(i )] can be bounded using R$i&1 . (Hence,
*[(T $(1), T $(2), ..., T $(k))] can be bounded using Pr[(M $, A$)(x) accepts]=
>k&1i=0 Ri$ .)
Claim 23. For V (or S$=(M $, A $)) and (M $, A$),
log *[T $(1)]=log R$0+ g$,
and for i=2, ..., k,
log *[T $(i )]<log R$i&1 + g i$+5k2nd 2,
with probability greater than 1&=(n). Here the probability is taken over the coin flips
of V.
Proof. Let X $(i ) be a possible acceptable (the first ith round) conversation of
(M $, A$) and S$. (Note that the possible values of X $(i ) are common between
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(M $, A$) and S$, since M $ is based on S$. Therefore, possible acceptable values of
r$ are common between them.) Let
Nver, (M $, A$)(X $(i ))=log *R$ (2)i ,
Nver, S$(X $(i ))=log *[r$ | _w$ # 0[S$(x, w$)  (X $(i ) V ; r$)]],
and Nver, (M $, A$)$(X $(i )) and Nver, S$(X $(i )) be the expected values of the Nver, (M $, A$)
(X $(i )) and Nver, S$(X $(i )) over the distribution of (M $, A$) and S$, respectively.
The difference between the output of (M $, A$) and of S$ restricted over 0 is just
the difference of the distribution of the messages of A$ and of A $. (That is, the
former is uniform and the latter may be biased.) Therefore,
Nver, (M $, A$)(X $(i ))=Nver, S$(X $(i )).
Let
Nver(X $(i ))=Nver, (M $, A$)(X $(i ))=Nver, S$(X $(i )).
Then,
Nver, (M $, A$)(X $(i ))= :
X $(i )
Pr
(M $, A$)
[X $(i )] } Nver, (M $, A$)(X $(i ))
= :
X $(i )
2Nver(X $(i ))& g^$ } Nver(X $(i )).
Here,
g^$=log *[r$ | S$(x, w$ # 0)  ( V ; r$)].
Next,
2d $2Nsim(r$)+k2+nd2*[r$ | S$(x, w$ # 0)  ( V ; r)]2d $2Nsim(r$)&k2nd2.
Therefore,
d $& g^$&k2nd 2Nsim(r$)d $& g^$+k2nd 2.
Hence,
d $& g^$&2k2nd 2Nsim(r$)d $& g^$+2k2nd 2,
when r$ is the output of S$ restricted over 0.
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Therefore,
Nver, S$(X $(i ))= :
X $(i )
Pr
S$
[X $(i )] } Nver, S$(X $(i ))
 :
X $(i )
(2Nver(X $(i )) } 2d $& g^$+2k
2nd22d $) } Nver(X $(i ))
= :
X $(i )
2Nver(X $(i ))& g^$+2k
2nd2 } Nver(X $(i )).
Thus,
Nver, (M $, A$)(X $(i ))= :
X $(i )
2Nver(X $(i ))& g^$ } Nver(X $(i))
:
X $(i)
2(Nver(X $(i ))&3k
2nd2)& g^$+2k2nd 2 } (Nver(X $(i ))&3k2nd 2)
Nver, S$(X $(i ))&3k2nd 2
=Nver, S$(X $(i ))&3k2nd 2.
We will now show that the claim is true.
Since the coin flips of M $ are restricted to 0, and P selects T $(1) over the coin
flips over 0, the acceptable set of r$ for M $ is exactly the same as [T $(1)]. Hence,
log *[T $(1)]=log R$0+ g$.
For i=2, ..., k, when V randomly selects wi$ , then wi$ # 0, with probability greater
than 1&e&2n. Therefore,
Pr[|Nver, S$(X $(i&1))&Nver, S$(X $(i&1))|<k2nd 2]>(1&e&2n)2.
Then
|log *[T $(i )]&Nver, S$(X $(i&1))|<k2nd 2,
with probability greater than (1&e&2n)2, over the coin flips of V.
On the other hand, when M $ and honest A$ randomly select their messages,
Pr[|Nver, (M $, A$)(X $(i&1))&Nver, (M $, A$)(X $(i&1))|<k2nd 2]>1&e&2n.
Then,
2Nver, (M $, A$)(X $(i&1))+k
2nd2>*R$ (2)i&1>2
Nver, (M $, A$)(X $(i&1))&k
2nd2,
with probability greater than 1&e&2n, over the coin flips of M $ and honest A$, since
Nver, (M $, A$)(X $(i&1))=log *R$ (2)i&1 .
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Therefore,
2Nver, (M $, A$)(X $(i&1))+k
2nd2>*R$ (2)i&1 >2
Nver, (M $, A$)(X $(i&1))&k
2nd2.
Hence,
log R$i&1 =log *R$ (2)i&1 &log *R$ (1)i&1
>(Nver, (M $, A$)(X $(i&1))&k2nd 2)& gi$
>(Nver, S$(X $(i&1))&4k2nd 2)& gi$
>(log *[T $(i)]&k2nd 2)&4k2nd 2& gi$
>log *[T $(i )]& gi$&5k2nd 2,
with probability greater than (1&e&2n)2, over the coin flips of V. Thus,
log *[T $(i )]<log R$i&1 + g i$+5k2nd 2,
with overwhelming probability. K
Using the above-mentioned claim,
:
k
i=1
log *[T $(i )]< :
k
i=1
log R$i&1+ :
k
i=1
gi$+5(k&1) k2nd 2,
with probability greater then (1&=(n)) (k&1)>1&=(n), over the coin flips of V.
Since we assume
Pr[(M $, A$)(x) accepts]= ‘
k&1
i=0
R i$ 12k
4n2d2,
we can obtain
:
k
i=1
log *[T $(i )]<G$&k4n2d 2+4(k&1) k2nd 2<G$&k4n2d 2+k4nd 2,
with probability greater than 1&=(n), over the coin flips of V.
Thus, since the size of z$ is (G$&k4n2d 2+2k4nd 2) bits, P can find (T $(1),
T $(2), ..., T $(k)) with probability (over the coin flips of V ) greater than
(1&2&k
4nd 2)(1&=(n))>1&=(n) (from Lemma 9 of the upper bound protocol).
4.4. Proof of Soundness
We assume that x  L (i.e., x # L). We will now show that for any P* (P*, V )(x)
accepts with negligible probability.
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Using a similar evaluation to that given in the completeness proof,
:
k
i=1
log R$i&1< :
k
i=1
log *[T $(i )]&G$+5(k&1) k2nd 2,
with probability greater than (1&e&2n)3(k&1), over the coin flips of V, M $, and A$.
Therefore,
Pr[(M $, A$)(x) accepts]<2
k
i=1 log *[T $(i )]&G$+5(k&1) k
2nd 2(1&e&2n) (k&1),
with probability greater than (1&e&2n)2(k&1), over the coin flips of V.
On the other hand,
Pr[(M $, A$)(x) accepts](1&12n)k4nd2.
Hence,
2
k
i=1 log *[T $(i )]&G$+5(k&1) k
2nd 2(1&e&2n) (k&1)>(1&12n)k4nd2,
with probability greater than (1&e&2n)2(k&1), over the coin flips of V.
Therefore, by neglecting log(1&12n)k4nd2 and log(1&e&2n)(k&1) as additive
factors, we obtain
:
k
i=1
log *[T $(i )]&G$+5(k&1) k2nd 2>0.
Hence,
:
k
i=1
log *[T $(i )]>G$&5(k&1) k2nd 2
>(G$&k4n2d 2+2k4nd 2)+(k4n2d 2&2k4nd 2&5(k&1) k2nd 2),
with probability greater than (1&e&2n)2(k&1), over the coin flips of V.
Therefore, from Lemma 9 of the upper bound protocol, and P* can find a
message that makes the verifier accept with probability less than
2&(k
4n2d2&2k4nd 2&5(k&1) k2nd 2)+c(1&e&2n)2(k&1)+4(k&1) e&2n<=(n),
where c is a constant. Thus, Pr[(P*, V )(x) accepts]<=(n).
4.5. Proof of Zero-knowledgeness
When x # L, for an honest verifier V, a simulator S for (P, V ) can be constructed
as follows: First, S does the same procedure as V. Then, S sets
(T $(1), T $(2), ..., T $(k))  (U$(1), U$(2), ..., U$(k)).
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Since the success probability of (P, V ) is greater than (1&=(n)) (see proof of
completeness), the simulated conversation, which is a random variable over the
coin flips of S , is clearly statistically close to the real conversation, which is a
random variable over the coin flips of P and V.
5. PROOFS OF COROLLARIES
Several corollaries are immediately derived from Theorems 1 and 2 and
[GSV98].
Corollary 3
Proof. This can be directly obtained from Theorem 1 and [GSV98]. K
Corollary 4
Proof. This can be directly obtained from Theorems 1 and 2. K
Note that Fortnow’s theorem [For89] can be proved by using Corollary 4 and
[GS89]. In other words, this paper shows another corrected proof of this theorem.
Corollary 5
Proof. This can be directly obtained from Corollaries 3 and 4. K
Corollary 6
Proof. First, the public coin proof for L (say P1) is obtained from the original
proof (say P0) by Theorem 1. Then, by applying Theorem 2, the private coin proof
for L (say P2) is obtained. We again apply Theorem 1 to P2 in order to obtain the
public coin proof for L (say P3). Finally the constant round proof for L is obtained
by applying Theorem 2 to P3. Note that all the above-mentioned transformations
preserve the statistical zero-knowledgeness. K
Note that the result by Aiello and Ha# stad [AH91] can be proved by using this
corollary and [GS89]. In other words, this paper shows another proof of their
result.
Corollary 7
Proof. If (P, V ) is an auxiliary-input SZKIP, then (P, V ) is also a SZKIP
against honest verifier. Therefore, (P, V ) can be transformed to a black-box simula-
tion ZKIP by Corollary 3, since the transformed protocol in the proof of
Corollary 3 (or [GSV98]) is a black-box simulation SZKIP. K
6. OPEN-PROBLEMS
We will show some remaining problems related to the results in this paper:
v Extend the results to ‘‘perfect’’ zero-knowledge proofs. (Find transforma-
tions that preserve ‘‘perfect’’ zero-knowledgeness.)
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v If language L has a statistical zero-knowledge proof, does L have a perfect
zero-knowledge proof?
APPENDIX A
Correctness of the 1-Round Naive Transformation
In the proof, all notations follow the protocol, and we assume that all variables
are accepted by the protocol (i.e., they satisfy the acceptance equations of A). Then,
the expression, ‘‘given :(1), ...*[r(1)]...’’ means that, given a fixed value of dummy
message :(1), ...*[r(1) | _w(Y )[S(x, w(Y ))  (:(1), V ; r(1))]]... .’’
Proof of Completeness
We assume that x # L. We will now show that (M, A)(x) accepts with probability
greater than 1&=(n). In order to prove it, we will have to prove that there are
sufficiently many elements of (:~ , r(1)) and (:(2), r~ ) to pass A’s verification in Steps 4
and 6.
So, we will show that, given :(1),
*[:~ ] } *[r(1)]>2 g(1&=(n)),
and given :~ ,
*[:(2)] } *[r~ ]>2 g(1&=(n)).
Let $=na1 (0<a1<1: constant).
Since (P, V ) is statistical zero-knowledge and Pr[(P, V )(x) accepts]1&12n,
*[r | _w[S(x, w)  ( V ; r)]>2 g(1&=(n)). Namely, the number of coin flips that S
outputs is greater than 2 g(1&=(n)). From the assumption, 2b+c is the number of
coin flips that S outputs. Therefore, 2b+c>2 g(1&=(n)).
The following equations are obtained directly from the assumption that
simulated :’s have the same complexity, b, and weight, c. Given :(1),
*[:~ ]=2b,
*[r(1)]=2c.
Hence,
*[:~ ] } *[r(1)]=2b+c>2 g(1&=(n)).
From Lemma 8 of the lower bound protocol, the first hashing protocol of
selecting :~ is accepted with probability greater than 1&2&$.
Then, :~ is (statistically) uniformly selected through the first hashing protocol by
A and M. (See Lemma 12 for the formal proof of this fact.)
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For (:, ;) randomly selected by simulator S (i.e., simulation based (P, V ), which
is statistically close to (P, V )),
R1=*[r | _w[S(x, w)  (:, ;; r)]*[r | _w[S(x, w)  (:, V ; r)]>1&=(n)
with probability greater than 1&=(n) (the probability is taken over the coin flips
of S).
Therefore,
*[r~ ]=2cR1>2c(1&=(n))
with probability (over the coin flips of A and M) greater than 1&=(n). (Note that
S(x, w~ )  (:~ , ; ; r~ ), and *[r | _w[S(x, w)  (:~ , V ; r)]=2c.)
Since *[:(2)]=2b, from the assumption,
*[:(2)] } *[r~ ]>2b+c(1&=(n))>2 g(1&=(n)).
From Lemma 8 of the lower bound protocol, the second hashing protocol of
selecting r~ is accepted with probability greater than 1&2&$.
Thus, (M, A)(x) accepts with probability greater than (1&2&$)2=
(1&2&n
a1)2>1&=(n).
Proof of Soundness
We assume that x  L. We will now show that, for any M*, (M*, A)(x) accepts
with probability at most 2&\, where \=na2 (0<a2<1, constant). In order to prove
it, we will prove that, if (M*, A)(x) accepts with probability greater than 2&\, then
there are too many elements of (:~ , r~ ), which leads to contradiction with soundness
of (P, V ).
The following equations are obtained directly from the assumption that
simulated :’s have the same complexity, f, and weight, e.
*[:(2)]=2 f,
and given :(1),
*[r(1)]=2e.
Therefore, if the protocol is passed with probability greater than 12\, then
*[:~ ]>2 g&e&$&\,
and given :~ ,
*[r~ ]>2 g& f&$&\.
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Therefore,
*[:~ ] } *[r~ ]>22g&( f +e)&2$&2\2 g&2$&2\.
(Note that e+ f  g.)
We then construct a prover, P*, of the original interactive proof (P, V ) as
follows: P* sends ; to V after receiving :~ from V with the same distribution of S.
In other words, after receiving :~ from V, P* randomly selects w~ under the
restriction of S(x, w~ )  (:~ , V ) and calculates and sends ; to V.
Since w~ , with which S outputs (:~ , r~ ) implies P*’s success strategy against the coin
flips of V$, (:~ , r~ ),
Pr[(P*, V )(x) accepts]>2 g&2$&2\2 g
=122$+2\
>12n.
This contradicts that x  L. Therefore, the protocol is passed with probability less
than or equal to 12\<=(n).
Proof of Zero-knowledgeness
When x # L, for an honest verifier A, a simulator S for (M, A) can be constructed
as follows:
[Simulator S ]
1. S randomly selects coin flips for simulator S, w(1) , w(2) and w~ .
2. S randomly selects (l+ g+1)_(g&$) matrix, H1 and H2 .
3. S calculates z1 and z2 such that
S(x, w(1))  (:(1), V ; r(1)),
S(x, w(2))  (:(2), V ),
S(x, w~ )  (:~ , ; ; r~ ),
H1(:~ , r(1))=z1 ,
H2(:(2), r~ )=z2 .
4. Finally S arranges these values in the order of the (M, A) protocol, and
outputs them.
We will then show that, given :(1) and randomly selected H1 , the simulated z1
is statistically close to the uniform distribution z1 , with overwhelming probability
(over H1).
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Given :(1), let C be (:~ , r(1)), which is a random variable such that
S(x, w(1))  (:(1), V ; r(1)),
S(x, w~ )  (:~ , V ),
and its distribution is based on S (with coin flips of w(1) and w~ ). From the assumption
of the uniform weight and complexity of the simulated messages,
Pr[C | :(1)]=(12c)(12b)=12 g.
Given z1 , let
PC={12
g
0
if H1(C )=z1
if H1(C ){z1 .
PC is a random variable with respect to the random selection of H1 .
PrH1[H1(C )=z1]=12
g*. In addition, for any C1 {C2 , random variables
H1(C1) and H1(C2) are independent. Since random variables, PC1 and PC2 , are
pairwise independent, we can use Chebychev’s inequality. To use Chebychev’s
inequality, we need the mean value, + and variance, _2, of PC .
+=12 g+ g*,
_2=EH1(PC&+)
2
=(12 g*) } (12 g&12 g+ g*)2+(1&12 g*) } (0&12 g+ g*)2
=12 g*+2g&122g+2g*<12 g*+2g.
Since the additive term 1 is negligible asymptotically, hereafter we ignore the term
and obtain
_2<12 g*+2g.
Hence, by Chebychev’s inequality (where the probability is over H1),
Pr _}:C PC&*[C] } + }&<*[C](12
g+ g*+$3)
=(*[C] } +) } 2&$3
>1&12 g*+2g(122(g+ g*+$3)2 g)
=1&2&$3.
Given z1 , C # C PC means the probability that H1(C )=z1 occurs, when C is
selected randomly and H1 is fixed. Hence, the above inequality shows that
|Pr[H1(C )=z1]&2&g*|<2&$3(2&g*)
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with probability (over H1) greater than 1&2&$3. Therefore,
:
z
|Pr[H1(C )=z]&2&g*|2 } 2&$3<1=(n).
Thus, given randomly selected H1 and :(1), simulated z1 is statistically close to
randomly selected z1 , with overwhelming probability (over H1). (This part
corresponds to Lemma 11.)
Similarly, we can show that, given randomly selected H1 and :(1), :~ determined by M
in the first round of this protocol is statistically close to randomly selected (by S) :~ , with
overwhelming probability (over H1). (This part corresponds to Lemma 12.)
So, we can prove that the simulated messages of the first round is statistically
close to the corresponding part of A’s view (the zero-knowledgeness of the first
round). Similarly, the zero-knowledgeness of the second round is satisfied.
APPENDIX B
k-round Naive Transformation
Here, we follow the notations of Section 2. The protocol of (M, A) is the transfor-
mation from an SZKIP, (P, V ), and S is the simulator of (P, V ). d is the random
tape length of simulator S for (P, V ), and g is the random tape length of V.
Protocol (M , A )
Common input: x
What to prove: x # L.
1. Let lj be the size of :j ( j=1, ..., k) of (P, V ), and Li=l1+l2+ } } } +li .
M sends X (i )( j) (i=3, ..., k+1; j=1, ..., i&2), and Y (i )(i ) (i=i, ..., k) to A.
Repeat the following protocol for i from 1 to k+1 sequentially.
(a) A selects a random (Li+ g+1)_(g&$) matrix Hi , and a (g&$)-bit
random string zi . A sends Hi , and zi to M.
(b) M finds w (i )(X ), 1 , w
(i )
(X ), 2 , ..., w
(i )
(X ), i&1 , w
(i )
(Y ) and v~
(i ) (and w~ only when
i=k+1) such that
Hi ((: (i )1 , :
(i )
2 , ..., :
(i )
i&1), :~ i , r
(i )) = zi ,
S(x, w (i )(X ), 1)  (:
(i )
1 , V ),
S(x, w (i )(X ), 2)  (X
(i )(1), : (i )2 , V ),
} } }
S(x, w(i )(X ), i&1)  (X
(i )(i&2), : (i )i&1 , V ),
S(x, w (i)(Y ))  (Y
(i )(i ), V ; r(i )),
S(x, v~ (i ))  (:~ 1 , ; 1 , ..., ; i&1 , :~ i , V ),
S(x, w~ )  (:~ 1 , ; 1 , ..., :k , ; k ; r~ ),
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where (: (i )1 , :
(i )
2 , ..., :
(i)
i&1) for i=1, and :~ k+1 are null strings, and
r(k+1)=r~ .
If there are many candidates for w (i )(X ), 1 , w
(i )
(X ), 2 , ..., w
(i )
(X ), i&1 , w
(i )
(Y ) and
v~ (i ) (and w~ only when i=k+1), one is randomly selected. If M cannot
find such w (i )(X ), 1 , w
(i )
(X ), 2 , ..., w
(i )
(X ), i&1 , w
(i )
(Y ) and v~
(i ), then M sends ‘‘give
up’’ to A and halts.
Otherwise, M selects ; i randomly based on the distribution of S.
M sends (w (i )(X ), 1 , w
(i )
(X ), 2 , ..., w
(i )
(X ), i&1 , w
(i )
(Y )), and (:~ i , ; i) to A, when
ik. When i=k+1, (w (k+1)(X ), 1 , w
(k+1)
(X ), 2 , ..., w
(k+1)
(X ), k ), and w~ to A.
(c) A checks the validity.
2. If all checks for i from 1 to k+1 are corrects, then A accepts.
[End of Protocol (M , A)]
Remarks. Completeness and zero-knowledgeness are proven similarly to those
in Appendix A. Roughly, soundness is also proven similarly as follows: From the
assumption of uniform complexity and weight,
*[:(i )1 ] } *[: (i )2 ] } } } *[: (i )i&1] } *[r(i )]=2 f1+ } } } + fi&1+ei,
:
k+1
i=2
( f1+ } } } + fi&1)+ :
k
i=1
ei
= :
k+1
i=2
( f1+ } } } + fi&1)+ :
k+1
i=2
ei&1= :
k+1
i=2
( f1+ } } } + fi&1+ei&1).
Hence, if each lower bound protocol is passed with probability greater than 12\,
then
*[:~ 1] } } } *[:~ k] } *[r~ ]>2(k+1) g&( i=2
k+1 ( f1+ } } } + fi&1)+
k
i=1 ei )&k$&k\
2(k+1) g&kg&k$&k\
=2 g&k($+\).
Then, there exists a prover, P*, such that
Pr[(P*, V )(x) accepts]>2 g&k($+\)2 g
=12k($+rho)
>12n.
This contradicts that x  L. Therefore, the protocol is passed with probability less
than or equal to 12\<=(n).
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